EU efforts to counter Russian disinformation risk becoming a source of disinformation themselves. Must read report on work of EU's East StratCom Task Force. https://reframingrussia.com/2020/04/06/covid-19-disinformation-two-short-reports-on-the-russian-dimension/

1/14 This report has generated considerable, mostly negative, reaction. Unfortunately, this has been more heat than light.

2/14 Perhaps because the report reminds us that responding effectively to the genuine threats posed to the West by Russia requires employing evidence and not emotion, open discussion of the nature of the threat and not ideology, practical analysis of what works rather than dogma.

3/14 Above all it underlines that the West must retain the moral high ground through ensuring that we promote truth through our Strat. Comms. and not mirror Russia’s propaganda approach.

4/14 Responding effectively to Russia’s threat requires understanding the actual nature of that threat and how best to respond. The report offers useful contributions on both counts.

5/14 Firstly, it raises the key question about what is the nature of the information space in Russia? Is everything under the direct control of the Kremlin and every story directed by a monolithic central command? The evidence suggests a more nuanced picture.

6/14 There is clear Kremlin direction and an overall political framework of media objectives. There is also fragmentation, political entrepreneurs bidding for the Kremlin’s attention, there is opportunism. There are spaces on the Russian Internet where control does not yet reach.

7/14 Secondly, Russia media is not only Kremlin propaganda. Russian media, to some degree, are a reflection of wider Russian society, especially Russian nationalism. Russia media are not simply a transmission system in a top down political order.

8/14 Just these two observations are vital if the West is to craft an effective and targeted approach to counter Kremlin propaganda.

9/14 Thirdly, for the West to be effective requires a constant questioning about whether our responses are achieving their aims. Here the report points to some important shortcomings in EU Strat. Comms.

10/14 It suggests more needs to be invested to professionalise the operation. Unlike during the Cold War, when similar operations employed trained professionals operating to the highest standards, the EU is relying on volunteers. This is amateurish.

11/14 Fourth, some of the EU output, according to the analysis in the report, is at best inaccurate. Worse, it may be actually misleading about Russia.

12/14 This risks harming the Western response, since it must be founded on accurate information if we are to aim at the right targets. Further, these failings can be used by Russia in its propaganda to claim that it is, in fact, the West that is the source of fake news.

13/14 Supporting evidence driven research and systematic analysis such as that which underpins this report is a key weapon in countering Russia.

14/14 While there will not be agreement about every point in the report, this is a professional study that needs to be taken seriously, and its conclusions should be discussed constructively.