‘The upbeat tone of that briefing stood in sharp contrast with the growing unease of many of the government's scientific advisers behind the scenes. They were already convinced that Britain was on the brink of a disastrous outbreak’ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci-idUSKBN21P1VF

‘From the outset... work by scientists had shown that, with only limited interventions, the virus would trigger an "overwhelming epidemic" in which Britain's health service was not going "to get anywhere near being able to cope with it. That was clear from the beginning."’

‘Johnson, who himself has sickened with the virus, moved more slowly than the leaders of many other prosperous countries to adopt a lockdown. He has been criticised for not moving more swiftly to organise mass tests and mobilise supplies of life-saving equipment and beds.’

‘...the option of the kind of stringent lockdown adopted early on in China, where the disease arose in December, and then followed by much of Europe and finally by Britain itself. The scientists' reasoning: Britons, many of them assumed, simply wouldn't accept such restrictions.’

‘Minutes of technical committees reviewed by Reuters indicate that almost no attention was paid to preparing a programme of mass testing.’

‘Other minutes and interviews show Britain was following closely a well-laid plan to fight a flu pandemic - not this deadlier disease. The scientists involved, however, deny that the flu focus ultimately made much difference.’

Wasn’t that plan tested and found wanting?

‘Now, as countries debate how to combat the virus, some experts here say, the lesson from the British experience may be that governments and scientists worldwide must increase the transparency of their planning so that their thinking and assumptions are open to challenge.’

Yes.

Advisors: ‘ They were too "narrowly drawn as scientists from a few institutions," he said. Their handling of COVID-19, Ashton said, shows the need for a broader approach. "In the future we need a much wider group of independent advisers."’

‘"Without faulting anyone so far, it's vital, where there is such a lot at stake, to throw the maximum possible light on the methods, assumptions and data built into our understanding of how this epidemic will develop," he told Reuters.’

‘At first, when NERVTAG met on January 13, it studied information from China that there was "no evidence of significant human to human transmission" of the new virus, according to minutes of the meeting. The scientists agreed the risk to the UK population was "very low."’

‘The evidence soon changed, but this wasn't reflected in the official threat level. By the end of January, scientists in China began releasing clinical data.’

‘Case studies published in the British medical journal, The Lancet, showed 17% of the first 99 coronavirus cases needed critical care. Eleven patients died.’

‘Another Chinese study, in the same magazine, warned starkly of a global spread and urged: "Preparedness plans and mitigation interventions should be readied for quick deployment globally."’

‘Edmunds recalled that "from about mid January onwards, it was absolutely obvious that this was serious, very serious." Graham Medley, a professor of infectious diseases modelling at the London School and chairman of SPI-M, agreed.’

‘He said that the committee was "clear that this was going to be big from the first meeting." At the end of January, his committee moved into "wartime" mode, he said, reporting directly into SAGE.’

‘Dr Jon Read, a senior lecturer in biostatistics at the University of Lancaster, also a member of SPI-M, said by the end of January it was apparent the virus had "pandemic potential" and that death rates for the elderly were brutal.’

‘In response to questions from Reuters, the government's Department of Health declined to clarify how the risk levels are defined... "Increasing the risk level in the UK is a belt and braces measure which allows the government to plan for all future eventualities."’

A guess?

‘As they watched China impose its lockdown, the British scientists assumed that such drastic actions would never be acceptable in a democracy like the UK. Among those modelling the outbreak, such stringent counter-measures were not, at first, examined.’

‘Assumed.’ Why? Mistake.

‘"We had milder interventions in place," said Edmunds, because no one thought it would be acceptable politically "to shut the country down." He added: "We didn't model it because it didn't seem to be on the agenda. And Imperial (College) didn't look at it either."’

‘The NERVTAG committee agreed, noting in its minutes that tough measures in the short term would be pointless, as they "would only delay the UK outbreak, not prevent it."’

Is not delay part of the point?

‘That limited approach mirrored the UK's longstanding pandemic flu strategy. The Department of Health declined a request from Reuters for a copy of its updated pandemic plan, without providing a reason.’

‘But a copy of the 2011 "UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011," which a spokesman said was still relevant, stated the "working presumption will be that Government will not impose any such restrictions.’

‘The emphasis will instead be on encouraging all those who have symptoms to follow the advice to stay at home and avoid spreading their illness."’

Well.

‘According to one senior Conservative Party politician, who was officially briefed as the crisis unfolded, the close involvement in the response to the coronavirus of the same scientific advisers and civil servants who drew up the flu plan may have created a "cognitive bias."’

‘"We had in our minds that COVID-19 was a nasty flu and needed to be treated as such," he said. "The implication was it was a disease that could not be stopped and that it was ultimately not that deadly."’

We knew that it was not from the early info on case fatality rate.

‘While the UK was prepared to fight the flu, Asian states like China, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea had built their pandemic plans with lessons learned from fighting the more lethal SARS outbreak that began in 2002, he said. SARS had a fatality rate of up to 14%.’

‘As a result, these countries, he said, were more ready to resort to widespread testing, lockdowns and other draconian measures to keep their citizens from spreading the virus.’

So the U.K. ignored the evidence of a Corona virus outbreak. Why?

‘Scientists involved in the UK response disagree that following the government's flu plan clouded their thinking or influenced the outbreak's course. The plan had a "reasonable worst case" scenario as devastating as the worst predictions for COVID-19, they note.’

‘By the end of January, the government's chief medical adviser, Whitty, was explaining to politicians in private, according to at least two people who spoke to him, that if the virus escaped China, it would in time infect the great majority of people in Britain.’

‘ It could only be slowed down, not stopped. On Jan 30, the government raised the threat level to "moderate" from "low."’

So at this time we knew it was lethal, particularly to the elderly, & it was certain to spread to the UK.

“Moderate” apparently was appropriate.

‘The country's medical officers "consider it prudent for our governments to escalate planning and preparation in case of a more widespread outbreak," a statement said at the time. Whitty did not respond to questions from Reuters for this article.’

Does he know too much?

‘On the evening of January 31, Boris Johnson sat before a fireplace in 10 Downing Street and told the nation, in a televised address: "This is the moment when the dawn breaks and the curtain goes up on a new act in our great national drama."’

Brexit was more important.

‘He was talking of finally delivering Brexit, or what he called "this recaptured sovereignty." Until that moment, Johnson's premiership had been utterly absorbed by delivering on that challenge.’