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Recent firing of Teddy Roosevelt CO highlighted issues that have been simmering for the Navy/DoD: 1) civ-mil relations in Trump administration, 2) Navy leadership/accountability, & 3) should we sacrifice the health of the fleet for presence missions (FONOPS, etc.)?
1) On civl-mil: Follow @jimgolby @ahfdc @lindsaypcohn and check out their recent piece in @monkeycageblog: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/05/this-is-what-was-so-unusual-about-us-navy-making-captain-brett-crozier-step-down/
2) On navy leadership/accountability: Follow @DoyleKHodges and check out his piece today in @WarOnTheRocks https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/the-navys-crisis-of-special-trust-and-confidence/
3) On readiness vs. presence. What are presence mission? Port calls, FONOPs (freedom of navigation operations), etc. to demonstrate U.S. navy power by sailing vessels all over the world, deterring states (cough- China) from . . . well this isn't always clear . . . (read on)
4) Presence msns are meant to deter states from closing trade routes (like Persian Gulf/Straits of Malacca), uphold agreements on global waters (cough, South China Sea), or shore up credibility w/allies. They demonstrate US firepower globally as a visible reminder of US power.
5) The problem w/presence missions is determining success. The mid 90s U.S. aircraft carrier transit through Taiwan Straits is a rare success story, but most of the time it is difficult to prove that any country is NOT doing something because we have X aircraft carriers at sea.
6) And in fact China continues to build outposts throughout South China Sea & harass neighbors in contested waters, despite U.S. presence missions in the area. Would Chinese behavior be worse if the US had less naval vessels conducting presence missions in the area? Hard to say.
7) In social science, we call these kinds of theories that are very difficult to prove or disprove non-falsifiable. This is a scientific no-no (alarms go off).
Falsifiability wouldn't matter if there was no trade-off between presence missions & other operational requirements.
Falsifiability wouldn't matter if there was no trade-off between presence missions & other operational requirements.
8) Unfortunately, a fleet always ready at sea sacrifices other long term health requirements for the fleet: maintenance, sailor morale, and even some training. Overworked, overtired, & band-aided sailors/ships lead to accidents. https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-mccain/
9) Prior to this pandemic, Navy was already struggling w/ whether the pace of presence missions (which were a short term response to Chinese moves in SCS, etc.) were eroding the Navy's ability to respond to Chinese long-term threats to build regional influence. Enter COVID-19.
10) CAPT Crozier's assertion that "we are not at war" and acting SECNAV Modly's response that "neither are we at peace" sums up this tension. Crozier was advocating for short term sacrifice in "presence" for long term health of the Navy fleet & its ability to counter China.
11) The Navy is not alone building strategies on deterrence, influence, or presence that offer no timelines or real ways of measuring strategic effectiveness. CYBERCOM's "persistent engagement" & even the endless fight in Afghanistan lack measurement & require endless resources.
12) The current health crisis will be a wake up call for the DoD who has not had to justify how the cost of these missions translates to national security. "Deterrence" has hid far too much bloat & lack of strategic priorities. Time for more butter, so better justify those guns.
