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Several journals are now publishing "short" articles, and this forthcoming paper in @The_JOP by Castañeda Dower, Finkel, @sgehlbach, and Nafziger (CFGN) is a great use of the format:
https://scottgehlbach.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CFGN-on-AR-Correction.pdf
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https://scottgehlbach.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CFGN-on-AR-Correction.pdf
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@daronacemoglu and Robinson (A&R) recently posted a correction to their 2000 QJE paper about democratization, which many @Formaltheory papers build on:
https://economics.mit.edu/files/12738
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https://economics.mit.edu/files/12738
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Most of you know A&R. Elites prefer to buy off the masses with redistribution whenever they pose a threat. But if the masses only rarely pose a threat, they can't give up their "one shot" and the only way to placate them is democratizing.
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However, the original paper (and most that build on it) only consider two elite strategies: buy off the masses every time they pose a threat or democratize the first time they pose a threat.
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Another possible strategy for the elite faced with a threat is to say "Let us buy you off this time, and next time you are a threat we'll democratize." There is a range of the parameter space where the citizens prefer this to rebelling.
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Think of this strategy as the Lucy and Charlie Brown Deviation: "next time I'll hold the football for you"
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But if the elite can always get away with democratizing "next time", when next time comes around they could make the same promise:
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For this to be part of an equilibrium, the masses need to be best responding, unlike Charlie Brown. The formal analysis in the A&R correction and CFGN's simplified version show that when the Lucy deviation is profitable, the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
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While this doesn't upend every model that builds on A&R, it does mean there is likely a similar mistake, which could pose problems. Fortunately CFGN have recently published a variant of the A&R model which doesn't face this problem.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/collective-action-and-representation-in-autocracies-evidence-from-russias-great-reforms/71B4846DE80510E033284FB82D123C82
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https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/collective-action-and-representation-in-autocracies-evidence-from-russias-great-reforms/71B4846DE80510E033284FB82D123C82
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The reason it works is they make the realistic shift to a model where the elite can democratize more continuously. This allows for choices in-between "don't democratize at all" and "full democracy now".
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As a result, the elite can democratize "just enough" to keep the citizens from rebelling. Allowing this continuous choice means we don't need to rely on more analytically complex mixed strategies to keep the masses indifferent.
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A main takeaway for those working in this class of models is that the continuous choice model may be more tractable when done correctly, and also can be nice for producing comparative statics.
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More broadly, we all make mistakes, and science progresses when we acknowledge and patch them. Also, we have some advice for Charlie Brown.
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