There seem to be a number of things true about the universe which didn't have to be true:

1. It exists

2. It obeys regularities / laws, rather than being in a perpetual state of random flux or in complete stasis 1/

3. In both the natural and social world, orders systematically emerge out of blind and unguided processes in multiple domains (organisms, ecosystems, solar systems, the basic structure of the universe, language, law, markets, etc)

4. Conscious, intelligent, life 2/

5. Free will (or at least the appearance of it)

6. Goodness, beauty, love, mercy, compassion, courage, etc (or at least the appearance of them)

The list could go on. 3/

I think two separate arguments can be made from this:

a) Out of the total set of possible universes, it is unlikely that one with these features would exist by chance. But if God exists, a universe with these features would be to be expected. 4/

b) God is causally (or otherwise explanatorily) necessary for the obtaining of one or more of these features of the universe. 5/

There are several issues with each of these arguments. For instance:

- Would we expect a universe with any seemingly gratuitous evil - let alone so much of it - if a benevolent God exists?

- Seemingly gratuitous evil aside, why wouldn't we expect a universe which wasn't just 6/

good, but completely perfect (like the highest level of Paradise is supposed to be)?

- The counter made to the above arguments is usually something along the lines of

i) we can't know in principle what things are good and bad, or at least we can't have perfect knowledge as 7/

this matter, and therefore we cannot know (or are at least limited in our knowledge) as to what a benevolent God would and would not do; and/or

ii) even if we can have some (or even perfect) knowledge of what things are good and bad, we have limited to no knowledge as to how 8/

best to achieve the goods and avoid the bads, and therefore we cannot know (or are at least limited in our knowledge) as to what a benevolent God would and would not do.

The problem with both of these arguments is that, if we have limited or no knowledge as to how God is 9/

likely to act, then how can we say what sort of universe God is likely to create?

To avoid these objections to my original argument, we've ended up undermining the argument itself.

- In any case, even if we can say that a universe like ours is to be expected if God exists 10/

part of the very concept of "God" as traditionally presented is an entity to which an innumerable amount of gratitude is owed. But why would such gratitude be owed to a being for which all the goods we enjoy come at no cost whatsoever (less than the snapping of a finger), and 11/

which it seems could have provided far more goods at no cost (unless this is the best of all possible universes - which seems unlikely given what we can imagine, and given the promise of Paradise) 12/

- It is unclear how we can speak of probabilities with respect to (logically, metaphysically, and nomologically possible) universes. This will depend on, inter alia, what we think the correct account of probability is: a minefield of a subject. 13/

- How would we establish that God is causally, or otherwise explanatorily necessary, for one or more of the original list?

- Even if we could establish this, how would we establish that X being necessary for Y's explanation = X exists? Perhaps not all Ys need an explanation. 14/

- The concepts of "cause", "explanation", etc themselves are fuzzy and need explication, and may not even be coherent.

I could go on. 15/

The reason I present these objections is not because I think my original two arguments are unsound.

On the contrary, my hunch is that they're both sound.

I'm just outlining the difficulties involved in actually demonstrating their soundness.

Just some thoughts. 16/16

Some further thoughts (follow my replies through, I've tried to thread them all together): https://twitter.com/Evollaqi/status/1246860038506975233?s=19