1. The Taliban released a statement accusing the Afghan government & U.S. of violating the Feb. withdrawal agreement. The Taliban notes (correctly) that nothing in the accord prohibited them from continuing to launch attacks, but the group says it& #39;s focused mainly on rural areas.
2. U.S. military and diplomatic officials claimed in a series of statements that the agreement called for a "reduction of violence," but that phrase isn& #39;t in the accord, nor is there anything similar. It is an example of wishcasting: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/03/generation-jihad-ep-2-wishcasting-in-afghanistan.php">https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/...
3. @billroggio has been collating the Taliban& #39;s claimed attacks since the Feb. 29 withdrawal agreement went into effect. The Taliban claimed 405 attacks in the first 24 days. See here: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/03/taliban-attacks-against-afghan-security-forces-continue-unabated.php">https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/...
4. The Feb. 29 agreement wasn& #39;t necessary to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan. It is an incredibly weak and lopsided deal - in the Taliban& #39;s favor. It granted the Taliban some significant concessions in return for little or even nothing: https://thedispatch.com/p/no-deal-is-better-than-a-bad-deal">https://thedispatch.com/p/no-deal...
5. According to @SecPompeo, the main alleged benefit of the deal is that the Taliban is going to break with & even "destroy" al-Qaeda. The deal doesn& #39;t say that. Moreover, the Taliban has yet to renounce AQ, let alone betray its longtime jihadi brethren more than one month out.
6. @SecPompeo & @US4AfghanPeace sold the Taliban& #39;s supposed counterterrorism assurances as the main benefit of the deal for Americans. But there are no verification or enforcement mechanisms for those same assurances. How was the Taliban& #39;s compliance supposed to be monitored?
7. So now we have a situation in which the Taliban is accusing the U.S. & Afghan government of failing to comply with a deal that asked little to nothing from the Taliban itself. This is one reason, out of many, why no deal was always better than a bad deal.
8. @USFOR_A has responded to the Taliban& #39;s statement. But again, there& #39;s nothing in the Feb. 29 withdrawal agreement calling for a "reduction in violence." Read it for yourself here:
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf
https://www.state.gov/wp-conten... href="https://twitter.com/USFOR_A">@USFOR_A response to Taliban today: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1246756748943335424">https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/s...
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf
https://www.state.gov/wp-conten... href="https://twitter.com/USFOR_A">@USFOR_A response to Taliban today: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1246756748943335424">https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/s...
9. The Taliban again refers to itself as the "Islamic Emirate" in its statement.
One erroneous premise underlying the deal is that the Taliban would be willing to give up its quest to resurrect its totalitarian Islamic Emirate. A mountain of evidence says that& #39;s not true.
One erroneous premise underlying the deal is that the Taliban would be willing to give up its quest to resurrect its totalitarian Islamic Emirate. A mountain of evidence says that& #39;s not true.