A thread on the firing of the CO of USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71). I'm not sure any reader is going to be perfectly satisfied by what I write, but that's the way the ball bounces. Let's start with what we know. An sophisticated, experienced, Naval Officer in command of a

nuclear powered aircraft carrier drafted a well-written four page letter laying out his assessment of the emergency facing his crew and desired actions of his chain of command to fix them. We also know that this commanding officer was removed from command on the orders of the

acting Secretary of the Navy as a result of the letter having found its way to the open press. We have heard from the @SECNAV https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=112537, but we have not heard from the CO (CAPT Crozier). So now, let's move to things we assert, but which we don't know. First, I

believe CAPT Crozier knew when he hit send on the email containing this letter that it could very well result in his being removed from command. Anyone who commands a Navy ship understands that it is not a birthright, and if you ask most who have (I'm one), they'll tell you that

they had more than one conversation with themself in which they acknowledged that there were circumstances in which you would take the command at sea pin and put it on your boss's desk and say "I'm out". I think Crozier reached this point. The interesting question to me is why?

Time and thorough investigations will tell, but the most logical explanation is that he HAD done all these things but that the Chain of Command wasn't acting. I cannot judge this, but @SECNAV statement above indicates that prior to the letter being released, he had gotten

assurances from the very top that his needs would be met. But I am not certain of the chronology. But what I AM certain of is that the manner in which the letter was drafted and circulated (on unclasssified networks) without handling markings (at least For Officieal Use Only)

virtually assured that it would be leaked. I am not saying Crozier leaked it. I'm saying the way he wrote and distributed it ensured its wide distribution. When this matter is thoroughly investigated, it will be useful to understand the degree to which Crozier was or wasn't being

well served by the Chain of Command. Bottom line for me: Crozier did what he thought was right for the safety and health of his crew, he determined that losing command was worth the risk of saving lives, and he let it ride. Let us now turn to the institutional Navy. A word of

insight--I consult to the Navy. What I am writing here is what I think, and if they asked me, which no one has, would have been what I told them. So, the letter hits the press. @SECNAV -- and presumably others -- are caught by surprise. It instantly becomes a global news story.

They are trying to manage a large and global organization's response to a pandemic. While CAPT Crozier has unimpeachable and unmatched "on scene" insight, he has little or no understanding of the scope and totality of the problem facing Navy leadership. He is doing his job as he

sees fit. And so was @secnav This is the most important point I can get across here. Both Crozier and Modly have done "a" right thing here. I'm not saying there was only one course of action for either of them. I'm saying that among the right answers, each chose one.
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Crozier wrote his letter knowing it would likely mean his firing. Modly fired him likely knowing it would be an unpopular decision. Both men were right. Both men did their jobs. The Navy's institutional reaction to Crozier and his crew's plight was NOT working fast enough on

scene. Given that Crozier did not know what was headed his way or what the breadth of the response was going to be, Modly's removal of him from this job was warranted. The country simply cannot have a Navy in which its commanders are freely communicating their concerns open

source, NO MATTER HOW RIGHT CROZIER WAS IN THIS PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE. Crozier's action got the attention he sought, good things are happening, and the crew is being taken care of. It cost him his command, but as I said, I suspect he knew it would. I honor his sacrifice, and

hope that the Navy continues to pick men and women for command who UNDER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES do what is necessary to ensure the safety and readiness of their crew and their ship. But the NORM must continue to be using the chain of command and appropriate networks and

transmission paths. The NORM must be the chain of command. That NORM must be protected institutionally by those entrusted with its upkeep...men like @SECNAV . To conclude--I hope that in his place, I would have done what Crozier did. Had I, I would have known that it would

be the end of that command. And if I were in Modly's place, I would likely have done exactly what he did. Command is a unique position in the Navy, and an enormous amount of trust is placed in the CO. Crozier appears to have violated that trust. The optics and the narrative

are terrible for the Navy right now, and it occurs to me that there were other "right" paths Modly could have taken. But I do not fault him for the decision he made. Fin.