Not that long ago, it seemed our biggest challenge in the West was the rise of insurgent populist & anti-establishment movements.

What does #coronavirus mean for the West's 'populist moment’?

[Thread…]

1. On one hand, there's much to suggest the more flippant, opportunistic forms of the populist campaigning style over recent years are now deeply out of vogue. After all, COVID-19 compels leaders to mobilise the full capacity of the state – leaning heavily on their institutions.

2. Perhaps nowhere has this turnaround been more dramatic than in the United Kingdom, with the pandemic forcing the Johnson team to put their Brexit-era populist rhetoric to bed, and fully inhabit their role and responsibilities as governors.

3. The mainstreaming of right-wing and nationalist populist movements and parties across the West over the past decade has often been depicted as a homogenous phenomenon – yet this crisis has emphasised the distinctions between their esoteric national manifestations.

4. In particular, those focused on dismantling established democratic institutions without a clear vision of how they will be replaced & those seeking to harness the tools of the legislature and the power of office to build an authoritarian state in the image of a democracy.

5. The authoritarian nature of some leaders is becoming a more important factor in shaping their approach to governance than their populist instincts. It is difficult, after all, to make a case against ‘the establishment’ when it is needed to lead the response against COVID-19.

6. Leaders can, however, exploit the power this pandemic vests in the hands of governments to advance their march on democratic safeguards. See, for example: Hungary, Russia, Poland, Israel etc.

7. These acts highlight the double challenge facing the West (& UK’s integrated review!) when we finally reach transition. We now have to address pre-existing structural problems, AND the further incursions on democracy, multilateralism and openness, arising during the pandemic.

8. With borders closed around the world, and global supply chains disrupted, how will liberal democracies make the case for a return to the connectivity of the past – which has been framed, in this crisis, as an existential weakness?

9. One of the greatest unknowns about this crisis is how it will affect the social fabric of our nations. After all, the rising prominence of populism in our politics reflects the growing salience of deep social challenges that had been brewing over the course of many years.

10. Existing social tensions may be dulled within crisis, but surely cannot be expected to be eradicated. Moreover, the dramatic impacts of the pandemic on economic, social and political settlement will undoubtedly produce new conflicts as we move beyond the eye of the storm.

11. And yet - we are also, during this crisis, experiencing an evolution of our relationship between citizens and governments. Approval ratings for leaders appear to be improving, suggesting a degree of buoyancy in political trust after many years of decline and stagnation.

12. One more thing: while constraints on personal freedoms may encourage citizens to value them more dearly, also entirely feasible that the dramatic social and economic interventions of the state foster new expectations around governments’ role in reducing income inequality.

13. The same is true of environmental movements, surely to be one of the beneficiaries of the pandemic. As such, there is a distinct possibility that left-wing populism, not right-wing, could be first out of the blocks as we seek to rebuild our wounded economies.

14. So - it’s too early to be certain if COVID-19 will stir conditions that deepen or undermine populist movements; but it's clear neither pathway is inevitable. And that the deep social tensions, put on hold during the crisis, will be waiting for us on the other side….

[ends]

I've put this all in an article here: https://bfpg.co.uk/2020/04/covid-19-populism/