I personally think that Mullah Fazil and the Taliban leadership should certainly be taken at face-value when they say that the purpose of talks is to achieve the following:

1. Emirate
2. Sharia
3. Victory

Let me indulge. Thread https://twitter.com/KateClark66/status/1245280549184421888

VICTORY:
It was through talks that the TB achieved what it never could militarily - as in - the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Given this success, TB will be wanting to try their hand at negotiating a settlement that leaves them with the most leverage in the new political system

This option is even more appealing, if it leaves their military juggernaut intact. In such a scenario, if talks fails, they can always revert to their 'tried and tested' methods of continued armed struggle.

This is not to suggest that the TB are not sincere. On the contrary, I would argue, that the TB, like most other Afghans, are weary and tired of war & would much prefer a less bloody path to their goal than the current one.

But when you raise an entire generation with promises of either death or victory, you do have to consider, how and when you start toning down on your rhetoric.

From that perspective, it makes sense why Mullah Fazil would continue to employ this language.

SHARIA:

I don't think anyone should be mistaken in thinking, that the TB will not have this as their 'redline' in any negotiated settlement.

Contrary to popular belief, the Taliban are much more ideological than they are given credit.

The Taliban's strict social rules, the demolition of the Buddha statues, and the refusal to hand over OBL were all ultimately actions based on their interpretation of Islamic law.

It would be stupendous naivety to assume that the TB will give this up for a few ministries.

Anyone who thinks this should seriously reconsider their views and beliefs regarding the pending intra-Afghan talks.

The Taliban have been largely successful in squeezing out other Islamist actors and consolidating the core Islamist base in the country, precisely due to this.

They portray themselves as a pragmatist group that is willing to compromise on any issues so long as that position does not contradict Islamic law.

However, any issues that contradicts this law, then the TB purport to be completely unyielding & uncompromising.

For the TB, abandoning this position would antagonise a large segment of their current support base.

It will also open up opportunities for other groups to chip away at their support base.

This will essentially reduce the TB to another of the many Islamist actors in AFG

To be clear, yes, there are exceptions to the above claim. Currently, some non-orthodox groups such as Ikhwanis and Salafis do challenge TB monopoly over Islamism, but even with those two, the TB have managed to attract or retain a large chunk of their natural supporters.

The TB have largely been successful in this approach because of their orthodox approach of being uncompromising on core Sharia principles while willing to accommodate non-core ideas.

This is not a validity of this approach, but an explanation of why their interpretation of Sharia will play an essential role in the upcoming intra-Afghan talks.

Given how much trouble Islamic scholars had in dissuading the TB not to demolish the Bamiyan statues, one should expect that any talks on changing the TB's views on Sharia-related issues will be equally painstaking and laborious.

EMIRATE:

Again, anyone who thinks that the TB will simply abandon the idea of an Emirate for simply the chance to be part of the ruling structure, is not cognizant with the ideas that drives this movement.

To be clear, the TB certainly think of the Emirate as a core Sharia principle, that cannot be compromised one.

The same way that many in the current political order view Republic as a final straw that must be retained at all costs, many within the TB old this view on Emirate

From the TB perspective, a negotiated settlement will include an amalgamation of the two systems.

The TB did this in the 1990s, with a Prime Minister and Cabinet tasked with daily government business and the Amir or Head of State, having purview of core strategic decisions.

The closest example of this would be the Iranian theocracy, where a President runs the government but the Wilayat e Faqih controls key strategic decisions.

One can argue that in many ways this is not very different to the many dual-executive systems where you have a President and a Prime Minister.

Indeed, depending on the details, in such a system, power is less concentrated in one person than we currently have in Afghanistan

From this perspective, such a system, barring the nomenclature, is no different to many similar systems around world.

Despite this however, I think we will see this as a major hurdle in the intra-Afghan talks.

One possible breakthrough would be to admit this name, but on the condition that such person be elected through an election process, and/or, have limited terms of service.

Or another approach would be, to make it a constitutional Emirate, with the Emir having a symbolic role.

Regardless of the approaches taken, I think it would be worthwhile to explore an approach where we have more checks and balances on the power of the executive, and where the elected assembly plays a lot more active legislative and oversight role.

This is even more pressing in an era of rising authoritarianism, ethnic rivalries, acting-minister with no say by Parliament, and the callous disregard for constitutional conventions and norms we have witnessed in recent times.