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So Sam Freedman& #39;s dad, an emeritus professor of war Studies put the SAGE reading list through a meat grinder, applied the most government friendly reading of every element, and then this was shared as "not a u turn" https://twitter.com/jamesrbuk/status/1245388600725909506">https://twitter.com/jamesrbuk...
As it was explained multiple times during the daily presser by the CMO and CSO and their deputies: the original plan was to let it rip up until about "4 weeks either side of the peak" which was to be "about 12 weeks from now". During which peak bit, "cocooning" would happen.
There were two major mistakes that were made, one scientific, one half scientific half political. Both foreseeable and forseen.t
The scientific mistake was by the Scientific group on Pandemic Influenza : Modelling, SPI-M-O, who kinda just went their own way and used flu assumptions on hospitalisation rates and general spread for this NOT FLU. (Evidence was already available then that this was wrong)
This scientific mistake made the expectations about the curve much more "flattened", pushed out in time and with a lower peak death / hospitalisation, than it actually was (e. G. The concluded assumption being peak in about 12 weeks) and threading the needle of policy easier
The half and half mistake was the Nudge Unit / SPI-B. While SAGE was, understandably, quite cautious with the behavioural evidence and suggestions, they still left it on the table. Leaving a political choice on the table about that neat little trickshot of an 8 week long cocoon
The political mistake is the most obvious one, the menu looked like this:
1. Do what everyone else does, lockdown, take massive economic hit
2. Attempt a trickshot that your shakily grounded nudge unit tells you is both possible and preferable, and is economical
1. Do what everyone else does, lockdown, take massive economic hit
2. Attempt a trickshot that your shakily grounded nudge unit tells you is both possible and preferable, and is economical
Addendum to 2: you could only believe that this would lead to a manageable death toll if you only listen to your British scientists telling you British things in your British meeting room.
The data that both hospitalisation and spread will be much much much worse than the flu was already available then (reminder, this disease was discovered, tracked and studied for MONTHS by this point and is a SARS and not a flu)
The general public didn& #39;t "create a narrative" as much as they weren& #39;t only listening to that British meeting room and faced with an economic choice that only ever existed in that meeting room
They listened to the WHO, and they saw the rest of the world realising how bad it is.
They listened to the WHO, and they saw the rest of the world realising how bad it is.
The whole second peak talk was an important policy reminder but not, and I emphasise, NOT a point about the efficacy of quarantine. It was used as political backfill for the herd immunity strategy because its easy to paint the Chinese as silly even though the Chinese knew this
And on the point of the repeated claims of "following the science" and "at the right time", which are both majorly used by both government and government friendly journos to mean whatever is happening now:
They followed A (shakey af) science, not THE science. A
They followed A (shakey af) science, not THE science. A
And at the right time my arse. Once they came out of the British exceptionalism haze, it was very clear that the trickshot window never existed and basically just go full guns blazing, anything else will kill a LOT of people.
The reason why there aren& #39;t enough tests, there isn& #39;t enough PPE (aside from the systematic running down of both the health system and manufacturing, combined with efficiency drives cutting disaster planning first)
Is because the UK didn& #39;t think its gonna be that bad.
Is because the UK didn& #39;t think its gonna be that bad.
The reason why Boris Johnson came out and said "take it on the chin" is because SAGE was telling him that
1. It& #39;s kinda like the flu really
2. People behave like x
3. Spooking people costs money.
And he wasn& #39;t going to listen to a man called Tedros.
1. It& #39;s kinda like the flu really
2. People behave like x
3. Spooking people costs money.
And he wasn& #39;t going to listen to a man called Tedros.
It was an appeasement level mistake born out British exceptionalism and bravado, that thankfully was averted, but should in all honesty be treated about as nicely as appeasement is.
