MARTIAL LAW NOT NECESSARY

The TRUMP Card

How POTUS will lawfully make arrests, restore order and keep the public safe, all WITHOUT declaring Martial Law!

This will be a long, but worthy read.

I considered vastly simplifying this, but due to recent public fears and confusion, I felt it necessary to lay this out fully; to give everyone a clear and concise understanding of the powers and limitations the President currently holds.

Q has asked us: At what stage of the game do you play the TRUMP card?

The TRUMP card is imminent. But what is the Trump card?

Something that gives the President an extreme advantage.

Below, we will uncover how through the Constitution, Laws, and historical Precendences, Trump can lawfully execute the full extent of the military to make arrests and restore public order, all without declaring martial law.

As of March 21st, 5500 National Guard troops have been activated in 32 States, to aid efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19.

The WHO declared the virus a PANDEMIC on March 11th, with POTUS two days later classifying the virus as a National emergency. This will become important.

This has left many speculating if Martial Law is near.

Martial Law has always been a source of public contention, as many fear "dictatorship rules”, military law states, and have belief in the exclusion of the military from civilian affairs.

This anti-military sentiment expresses itself in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1897 (“PCA”).

Due to these widespread assumptions and fears, General Joseph Lengyel, Chief of the National Guard, posted to Twitter to combat the rumours of Martial Law or a Nationwide lockdown, tweeting:

There has been much confusion and debate recently over whether the President and the Executive office even has the authority to invoke martial law; and the current sights of National Guards flooding into cities across America have left many wondering what is really going on.

What is Martial Law?

In simple terms, martial law is the replacement of civil rule with temporary military authority in a time of crisis.

While its imposition is rare, the US does have several noteworthy instances where martial law was declared; including in times of war, natural disasters and civic disputes.

Though there is no precise definition of martial law, the US precedent holds that under it:

It is widely stated that when the writ of habeus corpus has been suspended, martial law is implied, even if not declared.

But declaring martial law is not without limits.

The Posse Comitatus Act, passed on June 18, 1878, essentially prohibits troops from carrying out "active" domestic law enforcement actions such as searching & seizing property and dispersing crowds.

Translated literally, “posse comitatus” means “the power of the county.”

The phrase reflects the traditional power of the Sherrif to call upon citizens to help maintain the peace, or conduct rescue operations.

Without having an explicit statutory or constitutional exception, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the military to “execute the laws" domestically.

In full, the Posse Comitatus Act reads as follows:

While the PCA criminalizes the prohibited conduct, no one has ever been successfully prosecuted under the PCA.

Instead, the PCA is generally asserted as a defense in cases where the lawfulness of government conduct is an element in the charged offense.

The PCA specifically states that the National Guard , Air National Guard and Coast Guard are all EXEMPT from the Posse Comitatus Act, and therefore can lawfully be activated in a law enforcement capacity on domestic soil.

The Posse Comitatus Act reads:

In addition, the PCA will apply to the National Guard, but ONLY when the Guard has been “federalized.”

Typically, the National Guard operates under the control of individual State Governors.

When the National Guard is under this State status, the limitations of the PCA do not apply, and the National Guard is free to assist in enforcing the law.

However, the President may place the National Guard into Federal service.

When in Federal service, the National Guard is an active part of the Armed Forces under Title 10. As a result, the limitations of the PCA will apply.

In terms of activities prohibited by the PCA, the PCA forbids members of the military from “executing the laws.”

As such, the military is free to assist civil authorities and perform activities that do not constitute civil law enforcement.

In general, courts have made a clear distinction between 'active' and 'passive' activities in determining what activities are permissible under the PCA.

Permissible activities include:

For disaster relief, permissible passive military activities include:

As noted above, if there is a constitutional or statutory exception, the PCA’s prohibition against the military’s involvement in ACTIVE civil law enforcement does NOT apply.

We will first analyze the PCA’s statutory exceptions, followed by the constitutional exceptions.

Congress created numerous statutory exceptions to the PCA. The Insurrection Act is the most notable statutory exception.

Other statutory exceptions include the use of the military to respond to violations of:

Many commentators have pointed to some statutory exceptions, that are not in fact exceptions at all.

Instead, these so-called exceptions merely create a role for the military in domestic law enforcement that is limited to “passive” involvement, rather than the “active” involvement that the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits.

For example, some have pointed to the Stafford Act as an exception to the PCA, which President Trump invoked on March 13th.

While the Stafford Act permits the President to declare "major disasters" and send in military forces for up to 10 days to preserve life and property, the military’s role is limited to PASSIVE activities.

The Stafford Act does not permit the military to “execute the law” as ACTIVE involvement, within the meaning of the PCA.

Others have pointed to DoD regulations as providing exceptions to the PCA. For example, DoD regulations provide that the US Government has an inherent right:

In addition, under the Department of Defense’s Immediate Response Authority, Commanders may provide:

The Constitution does not contain a provision that grants the President the authority to use the military to enforce the law.

The fact that the PCA requires “express” constitutional authorization has led some to argue that, because there is no explicit exception to the PCA in the Constitution, no constitutional exception exists. This is a clear misunderstanding.

Others argue that the requirement of express constitutional authorization in the PCA is a reference to the President’s constitutional powers, both express and inherent.

The legislative history of the PCA reflects this conflict between supporters and critics of the PCA.

History indicates that when the phrase “express Constitutional exception” was added, those who opposed the PCA believed that the Constitution gave the President inherent or implied powers to use the armed forces to enforce the laws domestically.

Those who supported the PCA maintained that the President had no such inherent power.

Whether the PCA’s constitutional exceptions include instances where the President is acting under inherent or implied constitutional power, turns largely on whether Congress has the authority to limit the inherent power of the President.

Many have argued that no statute can limit the explicit or implicit constitutional power of the President.

Under this argument, Congress basically overstepped its authority when it passed the PCA. However, the answer to this question remains unclear.

One of the more relevant cases now, is the National Guard units being called up to aid in the coronavirus pandemic.

The President has named the coronavirus a “major disaster” under the Stafford Act, which details how the Federal government can handle emergency responses; which no President has ever done before in response to a health epidemic.

While much of the coronavirus response falls under the purview of Federal government, “[enforcing] laws relating to public health and safety, falls squarely within the powers of the States under the Tenth Amendment.

In extreme circumstances, there is an exception: THE TRUMP CARD:

The Insurrection Act

The Insurrection Act, which allows the use of active duty or National Guard troops, for Federal law enforcement in cases when “rebellion against the authority of the US makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the US by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,”

Last invoked during the 1992 LA riots, the Insurrection Act essentially empowers the President to authorize the use of full military force in an ACTIVE law enforcement capacity on domestic soil.

When President Trump first sent troops to the southern border in October of last year, the move provoked widespread condemnation from experts in military law, and a plethora of news articles focusing on the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 were released.

Experts explained (correctly) that the Posse Comitatus Act statute explicitly prohibited using the military to enforce domestic law.

However, according to Professor Stephen Vladeck of the University of Texas School of Law, the Insurrection Act has always been understood “as the principle exception to that general rule" of the PCA.

As it stands today, the law reads:

According to Vladeck, invoking the Insurrection Act would be both “the most clearly lawful – and most historically indefensible” example of President Trump defying norms to empower the Executive Branch.

The Insurrection Act is the principal authority relied upon by the President when deploying troops within the United States in response to a domestic emergency.

The Insurrection Act serves as the major exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (which prohibits Federal military forces from actively participating in civilian law enforcement), WITHOUT congressional or constitutional authority.

When invoked by the President, the Insurrection Act allows Federal military forces to participate in ACTIVE domestic law enforcement activities.

The Limits of the Troops’ Authority under the Insurrection Act:

When the President uses the Insurrection Act to deploy troops in response to an emergency, the limits of the troops’ power are somewhat unclear.

For example, one might question whether the troops can make formal arrests, or whether they are limited to detaining citizens and turning them over to the appropriate civilian authority.

The Insurrection Act’s broad language does not explicitly limit the power of the troops, and appears to authorize the troops to use ANY MEANS NECESSARY to restore order.

While Department of Defense regulations do not specifically address the limits of the troops’ power, the regulations do permit active duty military to use "deadly force where it is necessary, to protect offenses against the person and in self defense," among other things.

Because the military can use deadly force, it seems only logical that they should also be able to take the less severe action of making arrests.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged this relationship between the use of deadly force and the authority to make arrests.

In reference to the means available to a State Governor to respond to disorder within his or her state, the Supreme Court has stated that:

The Court noted that such arrests are not necessarily to punish the wrongdoers. Instead, they may be “by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile power."

This was for a Governor, but the same rules apply.

Thus, the troops’ authority under the Insurrection Act does not appear to be limited to detention or arrests.

Invoking the Insurrection Act:

On March 11th, when the WHO declared the coronavirus an “epidemic” and “major health emergency”, this was the KEY!

The moment the Coronavirus was declared an "epidemic" and "public health emergency", was the groundwork for the Insurrection Act to become valid.

From there, we’ve witnessed a cascade of events that are laid out within the Act.

The Insurrection Act will now become the pre-requisite of cascading powers, such as: 50 U.S. Code § 212. Confiscation of property employed to aid insurrection, which reads as follows:

Did you catch that? Any person that has “promoted insurrection or resistance to laws” will have “..all such property shall be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found; and it shall be the duty of the President to cause the same to be seized, confiscated, and condemned.”

On August 29, 2005, the night of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco made her now famous request to President Bush for “everything you have got.”

This request came as Blanco began to realize that she lacked the resources to address the ongoing crisis in Louisiana.

As the situation deteriorated, Blanco followed up her earlier request to the President by specifically asking for assistance in the form of "Federal troops".

Traditionally, State Governors and their respective National Guard units (not the Federal government), are primarily responsible for handling domestic emergencies; because State officials are closer to the crisis and generally more familiar with the people impacted than the Feds.

Moreover, federalism dictates that the “preservation of law and order is basically a responsibility of the State and local governments.”

Unlike past Governors needing Federal military aid, Blanco did not want the Federal government to completely take over the relief efforts, nor did she want to lose control of the National Guard; a normal, but not mandatory, prerequisite for a State seeking Federal military aid.

So, despite requesting Federal military assistance, Governor Blanco did not ask President Bush to invoke the Insurrection Act.

Due to Governor Blanco’s refusal to request Federal troops pursuant to the Insurrection Act, President Bush sent a formal legal memorandum asking her to request a Federal take over of the relief effort.

When this also failed, President Bush suggested a hybrid command structure under which a 3 star General, commanded and controlled by the Federal government would be sworn into the Louisiana National Guard. The General would then control all of the troops in the area.

This suggestion was also rejected by Governor Blanco.

Governor Blanco’s refusal to either turn over the National Guard under her control or seek a Federal takeover placed the Bush Administration in a difficult position.

First, many Administration members were unfamiliar with the Insurrection Act and didn't know what action, if any, they could take.

More specifically, they were unsure whether President Bush could legally send troops, Federalize the Louisiana National Guard, or both, without having a request by Governor Blanco first.

Second, assuming that President Bush did have the legal authority to take action, some members of the Administration questioned the political wisdom of doing so, out of fear of public opinion.

After losing precious time, the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel eventually & correctly determined that, under Section 333 of the Insurrection Act, President Bush could take action by either sending troops or Federalizing the National Guard even WITHOUT Governor Blanco’s permission.

But instead of invoking the Insurrection Act, and contrary to military doctrine, two separate commands were put in place to handle the relief efforts. One command was directed by President Bush, and the other directed by Governor Blanco.

Because the Insurrection Act was not invoked, the Federal troops under the command of President Bush could not, pursuant to the PCA, participate in "active" law enforcement activities.

As the Hurricane Katrina relief effort illustrates, both Governor Blanco and President Bush, like previous elected officials before them, struggled to properly and promptly, deploy Federal troops during a domestic emergency.

This shortcoming was due to problems associated with:

1. interpreting the Insurrection Act
2. federalism; and
3. public opinion.

As noted above, confusion over the President’s authority to employ Federal troops to enforce civil law during Hurricane Katrina, prompted a debate over the need for an amendment to the Insurrection Act.

In a speech on September 15, 2005, President Bush made an address and stated:

Likewise, the White House Report on the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, criticized the current limitations on the Department of Defense’s ability to use “military capabilities during domestic incidents.”

Specifically, the report pointed to the requirement of requests for assistance from local governments, which resulted in a slow response by the armed forces, and a lack of coordination between National Guard forces and active duty military.

While the White House Report did not specifically point to the Posse Comitatus Act or the Insurrection Act as limitations that affected the Federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, the Report noted “limitations under Federal law and DOD policy.”

In light of these concerns, President Bush approached Congress and asked Congress to consider whether:

About a year later, Congress amended the Insurrection Act of 1807 to the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order Act (Enforcement Act).

The Insurrection Act enables the President to deploy the military “to suppress, in any State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.”

The amended Enforcement Act expanded the language of the original Act to include: natural disasters, EPIDEMICS, or other serious public health emergencies, terrorist attacks or incidents, or “other conditions”.

The amendment merely clarified situations that justify the use of the military to respond to a domestic disorder.

The changes in 2006 provide explicit examples of situations that may lead to events of public disorder justifying the President’s invocation of the Act’s authority.

Political and historical limitations, along with limitations in the Act itself, will restrict Presidential abuse of the power.

Thus, the uproar over the changes to the Insurrection Act and the fears of martial law are unfounded, as the amendment merely clarifies a power that the President ALREADY possessed.

The Insurrection Act as it stands today is a series of five pieces of legislation contained in 10 U.S.C. §§ 331 – 335.

Under section 331, upon a request from the State’s legislature or the State’s governor (if the legislature cannot convene), the President may call on the armed forces to suppress an insurrection.

But, unlike section 331, section 332 permits the President to act WITHOUT a request from the State.

Under section 332 the President may call for:

Section 332 appears to be a reflection of the President’s constitutional duty under Article II.

Section 333, the primary portion of the Act amended in October 2006, permits the President, without a request from a State:

Under the pre-amendment version of the Act, these conditions are twofold:

First:

Second:

On one side of the debate, are those who fear overreliance upon, and consolidation of military power within the Executive Branch.

Some believe that giving the President primary responsibility for handling domestic emergencies will increase the likelihood of martial law or rule by military force, and lead to the loss of civil liberties.

Those against expanding the role of the Executive Branch during domestic emergencies, feel the Federal government should be considered the last, not first, resort during times of civil disorder.

In contrast, others feel that due to the speed, size, scope, complexity, and magnitude of modern day domestic emergencies, combined with the potential for large scale suffering and loss, the Federal government should be in charge of all, except the most routine matters.

Supporters of this view argue, that even when at full strength, the National Guard of an individual State can quickly become overwhelmed during a crisis.

So taking a “wait-and-see” approach to determine whether a State can effectively handle a specific crisis, before involving the Federal government, puts both lives and property at risk.

So, the argument continues, that the Federal government with its superior resources, including the most advanced military in the world, should have primary responsibility for managing civil domestic disasters.

Regardless of this split in opinion, the Enforcement Act was passed with little fanfare or public scrutiny.

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees helped draft the Enforcement Act.

The Enforcement Act was then quietly tucked into a large defense authorization bill: John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007

Few people, including many members of Congress who voted on the defense bill, actually knew they were also voting to modify the Insurrection Act.

The secrecy surrounding the Enforcement Act was so pervasive, that the actual sponsor of the new legislation remains unknown to this day.

Unfortunately, for Enforcement Act supporters, this lack of openness helped lay the groundwork for the law’s ultimate repeal one year later.

Changes Brought by the Enforcement Act:

Most of the changes brought by the Enforcement Act involved Section 333 of the Insurrection Act.

As amended, Section 333 reads as follows:

S. 333 authorizes POTUS even against the wishes of a Gov., to deploy the militia or use any other means to suppress any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy” if such action denies any class of people its rights or obstructs the execution of the laws

Section 333 is generally invoked when a Governor and President are unable to reach some sort of mutual agreement to deploy Federal troops under Section 331.

When the President acts under Section 333, Federal-State relations are undermined because the President assumes command and control of the National Guard by Federalizing it.

The most controversial Section 333 amendment, which ultimately led to the Enforcement Act’s repeal, concerned a specific reference to events that, when combined with “domestic violence,” gave the President nearly unchecked authority to deploy troops domestically.

Section (a)(1)(A) adds to the previous version that the President may use the armed forces to restore public order resulting from:

The previous version of the Act contained no similar specification of instances that could lead to civil disorder.

In addition, this modification identifies “domestic violence”, as opposed to “insurrection, unlawful combination or conspiracy”, as the condition that will be caused by the natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other specified trigger.

The amendment of Section 333 identifying “domestic violence” as opposed to “Insurrection” will also become very important.

I will discuss the meaning of domestic violence and the significance of these changes further below.

The second important thing to note about the amendment is that under section (a)(3):

As a result, in any instance of insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, section (a)(2)(A) will be satisfied and the Insurrection Act will apply.

As noted above, for the President to invoke the Insurrection Act, a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other event must lead to “domestic violence”.

The inclusion of “domestic violence” indicates that whenever a natural disaster or other named event leads to domestic violence, then section (a)(1)(3) will apply, and the Insurrection Act is valid.

The State will be deemed to have denied its citizens equal protection of the laws, and the requirements of the Insurrection Act are satisfied.

Congressional opponents of the Enforcement Act, made two basic arguments against the new law.

1. It was asserted that the listed events “created triggers that make it virtually automatic that the Enforcement Act would be invoked during such emergencies.”

2. It was claimed that the events provided the President with unprecedented authority to deploy troops domestically.

Under both arguments, these critics claimed that the Enforcement Act would work to consolidate control of the military within the Executive Branch, resulting in Governors losing control of their respective National Guard personnel to the President during periods of civil disorder

The Enforcement Act’s defenders on the other hand, claimed that the changes would not necessarily result in greater domestic use of the military by the President.

Instead, they argued, the change to Section 333 was merely a clarification.

The law did not grant the President any new power, it only explained the authority the President ALREADY possessed.

The new terms, also did not operate without limitations, because "domestic violence" still remained a prerequisite to the President’s ability to deploy troops domestically.

While the Insurrection Act may appear to grant the President broad discretion in determining whether to deploy the armed forces domestically, the Act limits the President to responding only to instances of insurrection, unlawful combination, domestic violence, and conspiracy.

Because of this limitation, it is important to consider the meaning of these terms, in particular the meaning of “insurrection” and “domestic violence.”

Black’s Law Dictionary defines an insurrection as "a violent revolt against an oppressive authority, usually a government.”

While they fail to clearly define “insurrection,” DOD regulations define “domestic emergencies” to include:

“enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood or other major public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger the life and property or disrupt the usual process of government.”

An insurrection is distinct from a mob or riot, in that an insurrection involves an organized and armed attack on the authority or operations of the government.

Riots or mobs, however large, are deemed “disturbances of the peace which do not threaten the stability of the government or the existence of political society.”

The Act requires that a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or public health emergency create a situation of "domestic violence", not insurrection, that the constituted authorities are unable to quell.

Domestic Violence Clause:

Article IV, section 4, gives the Federal government the power to suppress domestic violence, “on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive”.

First, what is the meaning of “domestic violence”?

Second, what is the effect of the Clause’s requirement of a State to request for assistance?

The meaning of “domestic violence” has historically been, and continues to be, unclear.

During the Constitutional Convention, some drafters proposed replacing “domestic violence” with “insurrections.” This indicates that at least some of the framers believed the two phrases were interchangeable.

However, considering the plain language of the phrase, coupled with the fact that the framers chose not to substitute “domestic violence” with “insurrection”, there is a strong argument that “domestic violence” encompasses something beyond direct threats to the State.

In Luther v. Borden the Supreme Court took a different approach.

There, the Court considered, albeit cursory, the meaning of “domestic violence” and “insurrection” under the Militia Act of 1795. The Court stated:

While the Militia Act of 1795 did not use the phrase domestic violence, the Court equated “domestic violence” with “insurrection,” although implying that domestic violence occurs against a State, and insurrection occurs against the United States.

Unfortunately, the Court has not addressed the meaning of "domestic violence" since Luther v. Borden.

As a result, the exact meaning of the phrase in the context of the Domestic Violence Clause, remains unclear.

Other changes brought by Section 333 of the Enforcement Act occurred in the opening sentence, which was modified to:

This modification of the first sentence had two very significant effects. First, replacing the word “militia” with “National Guard” reduced the number of personnel available to the President when invoking the Insurrection Act.

This is because the word “militia,” as shown by the definition below, is much broader than the term “National Guard,” which is actually a subcomponent of the “militia.”

Title 10 of the United States Code states:

Thus, the Enforcement Act restricted the President to deploying only the “Armed Services” and the “National Guard” under Section 333.

But, the Insurrection Act permits the President to deploy both the Armed Services and the “militia,” which encompass not only the National Guard but other entities like the State Defense Forces (SDFs).

This difference is important, because under the Enforcement Act, unlike the Insurrection Act, the Governor maintains some military resources, including the option to retain control over State Defense Forces.

Section 333 of the Enforcement Act also required that the President inform Congress as soon as practicable when he deployed troops under this statute, and every 14 days thereafter, when exercising Federal authority.

First and foremost, this change reasserted the “role for congressional oversight", along the lines of the 30 day (later 60 day) time limit, in the early iterations of the Insurrection Act.

The reporting requirement also served as a backup to the early iteration "dispersal order", that ensured invoking the Insurrection Act was not a clandestine affair that went without public notice.

According to Professor Stephen Dycus, “part of the genius of the Insurrection Act is before it can be invoked the President has to make a public declaration that he is doing it. There is no way the President can use that exception to the Posse Comitatus Act secretly.”

But that's not the full scope of it.

Some legal minds have correctly downplayed the legal significance of a President failing to report to Congress, because in the end, any penalty for improperly using the Insurrection Act is generally administered by the PUBLIC, not the courts.

The one modification that occurred outside of Section 333, was the actual name change of Chapter 15 from “Insurrection Act” to “Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order.”

While it was mostly symbolic, changing the name of Title 10, Chapter 15 did appear to address previously raised concerns about the statute.

First, removal of the word “insurrection” from the statute, as the term itself is somewhat antiquated and rarely, if ever, used today.

Second, the change alerted that the statute encompassed MORE than just uprisings against the government. Instead, it dealt with public disorder in general.

This evolution, along with other previously mentioned changes, helped clarify a law that has long been misunderstood.

Also, at least one law review article argues that the real problem with deploying Federal forces during Hurricane Katrina, was simply a misunderstanding of the Insurrection Act, by all parties involved.

The Enforcement Act lent some clarity to the Insurrection Act, which was plagued by both broad and undefined terms throughout its 200 hundred year history.

Finally, changing the title of the Insurrection Act, seemed to signify that the use or commitment of Federal troops was more open-ended, and likely to continue even after the violence or threat has ended.

The Source of the President’s Power to Respond to Domestic Disorder:

The Founders of the US Constitution constructed the Constitution in such a way as to specifically define each branches’ roles & powers, creating a system under which each branch has limited and separate powers

However, in the arena of military affairs, the roles of Congress and the President often overlap.

The Insurrection Act demonstrates the interplay between these overlapping roles, and the recent Amendment to the Insurrection Act has raised two primary questions regarding Presidential and Congressional power.

First, what constitutional authority does the President have to respond with force to civil disorder resulting from natural disasters?

Second, to what extent can Congress expand or contract any constitutional power that the President possesses?

Scholars have asserted two primary sources of the President’s authority to employ the military to restore order during domestic disturbances.

First, the more prominent argument is that, while the Constitution does not explicitly provide the President with the authority to use the military to restore order following an emergency, the President possesses at least some inherent powers to use force to restore order.

Under this argument, the President’s authority stems from Article II, section 3, which states, the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The second argument maintains that the President’s power to employ the military does not stem from the President’s inherent powers. Instead, the power to use force to respond to domestic disorder is Congressional.

But, through the Insurrection Act, Congress DELEGATED its constitutional authority to the President.

The distinction between the sources of the President’s authority is important for several reasons.

First and most importantly, if the source of the President’s authority is through delegation by Congress, then Congress can easily limit the President’s power.

Conversely, if the President possesses inherent power to respond to domestic disturbances with force, then Congress is without authority to limit the President’s authority.

If this is the case, then the limits of the PCA are largely meaningless and invalid.

In addition, any argument that the amendment to the Insurrection Act expanded the President’s power would fail, because even before the amendment, the President already possessed broad power to respond to domestic emergencies.

Thus, regardless of whether the President has inherent authority to respond to domestic disorders, or whether Congress delegated its authority to the President to respond, the President possesses such a power, under the Insurrection Act.

So long as the President possesses such power, regardless of its source, then the President’s authority under the Insurrection Act is valid.

Despite fears of martial law and abuse by military personnel, the actual amount of fighting the soldiers have engaged in while acting under the Insurrection Act, has been small.

History demonstrates that the mere presence of a small number of military personnel has been sufficient to quell civil disturbances.

As you can now fully understand, the coronavirus has now fully “set the stage” for the President to invoke the Insurrection Act; which then activates the full use of the Executive powers and military forces lawfully on domestic soil to execute ACTIVE involvements.

So when will the President pull the Trump card? We will soon find out!

Trump card coming - Q

Look to Twitter:
Exactly this: “My fellow Americans, the Storm is upon us.."

It's very likely, this is the President’s public proclamation to the world that the Insurrection Act has been invoked; although it may already be invoked without us knowing!

By invoking the Insurrection Act instead of declaring Martial Law, the President is held to account from the PUBLIC instead of the Judiciary. The virus “epidemic” has validated the use of the Act, which now activates the full extent of the military forces in an "active" capacity.

The President does not need to inform Congress, unless he chooses to.

The Insurrection Act "TRUMPS" everything.

The moment the President decides to pull this card, to be blunt, GAME OVER!

Sources:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurrection_Act

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posse_Comitatus_Act

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/212

Sources:

https://www.stetson.edu/law/lawreview/media/document/an-insurrection-act-for-the-twenty-first-century.pdf

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/disasters/Crockett.pdf

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/03/17/will-coronavirus-lead-to-martial-law/

Sources:

https://www.google.ca/amp/s/lawandcrime.com/high-profile/the-insurrection-act-how-trump-can-unleash-americas-military-at-the-border/amp/

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/03/nearly-5500-national-guard-troops-deployed-in-32-states-over-coronavirus-outbreak/?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=the-gateway-pundit&utm_campaign=dailypm&utm_content=weekend

Thank you all! I know it's a lot of legal terminology to take in, but it's important to have a concise understanding of this topic in light of current times.

Remember,
Patriots are in control!

- LadyQ

@threadreaderapp please unroll