The withdrawal provisions in this Afghanistan agreement seem far more comprehensive than advertised. It’s a TOTAL withdrawal of ALL American and NATO forces within 14 months. That would likely produce a gradual collapse of the state, civil war, and the Taliban back in Kabul.

I helped negotiate the 2008 SOFA in Iraq, which called for a three-year withdrawal timeline but also had an extension arrangement through another deal signed in parallel (known as the SFA). We all presumed at the time it would be extended in 2011 to retain a small residual force.

The lessons learned: 1) It’s extremely difficult to condition a withdrawal once it’s written and expectations form with constituencies on all sides. 2) The withdrawal of American forces does not end an endless war. In Iraq, we returned three years after we left.

I had understood this new pact provided for a CT-focused presence similar to the extremely limited and sustainable structure we built to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That mission was designed to account for risks of over-reach and over-investment. Not endless war. And it worked.

Perhaps there’s more in the secret annexes. (Secret terms also aren’t a great sign.) Given historical import, legacy of 9/11, and what may follow, the American people should understand what if any conditionality is built into this deal and how Taliban compliance will be measured.

None of that is in the text. From the face of the text, it looks as through Trump wanted out and we negotiated an arrangement to make it seem like that outcome is part of a historic agreement, when in reality the agreement gives the Taliban most of what it had always wanted.

We all hope this can work somehow. Americans should no longer be dying in Afghanistan. And Khalilzad deserves tremendous credit. But from the face of the text, the agreement does not seem to end a war so much as plant the seeds for a new one. That’s the concern. Hope I’m wrong.