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1/13 Is virtue signaling a perversion of morality? Here, Neil Levy says "no." https://aeon.co/ideas/is-virtue-signalling-a-perversion-of-morality
2/13 The title is a bit misleading. Levy is actually pushing back against the smaller claim that virtue signaling is not “moral discourse,” which others have defined as a kind of talk whose end is to improve other people’s moral beliefs. https://aeon.co/ideas/is-virtue-signalling-a-perversion-of-morality
3/13 Against this backdrop, Levy argues instead that virtue signaling *is* a legit feature of moral discourse because signaling could be one of the evolved functions of moral discourse. https://aeon.co/ideas/is-virtue-signalling-a-perversion-of-morality
4/13 Levy invokes two evolutionary definitions of signals. His treatment of the evolutionary ins and outs of signaling are a bit muddled, but he can’t be blamed for that because my sisters and brothers in evolutionary psychology misuse them constantly. https://aeon.co/ideas/is-virtue-signalling-a-perversion-of-morality
5/13 Basically, Levy argues that people signal their virtue to obtain one of the plausible evolutionary functions of signaling: access to membership in a valued social group. Levy’s position is understandable because our ancestors died without membership in awesome groups.
6/13 But arguing that virtue signaling has a legitimate place in moral discourse just because it has a legit non-argumentative function still feels wrong. It still feels like something we want to condemn, or at least discourage, in discourse about how we should treat each other.
7/13 Here, to me, is better way to understand what’s going on. Sure, people might use virtue signaling to obtain social belonging, but this is at best a side effect of their participation in what they and their audiences presume they are doing: taking part in a moral argument.
8/13 We dislike virtue signaling not only because we see baser motivations behind it, which reveal bad faith, but also because the arguments it yields are so weak and so inimical to what we really want from moral discourse: better beliefs about how to treat each other.
9/13 If I express outrage at your misguided moral convictions, throw hastags at you, etc., I might believe I am trying to change your mind about your beliefs. I might still believe that I am engaging in moral discourse, even as I grab additional social benefits for myself. Fine.
10/13 But the reason you're entitled to frown upon my virture signaling--to claim it has no place in grown-up moral discourse--is that it’s an unconvincing way change my moral beliefs. “You’re a bad person if you believe that” is an argument, but it’s a lazy and distracting one.
11/13 One is justified in frowning upon virtue signaling, therefore, because it’s such an ineffective way to make an argument for one’s position. It’s so easily brushed aside that it is incapable of encouraging someone to climb even one rung up a ladder of reasonableness.
12/13 And here’s the most serious problem with virtue signaling: it’s not only a weak and lazy way to argue, but also one that discourages further moral discourse.
13/13 Your lazy name-calling and hollow expressions of outrage imply that you have nothing meaningful to offer as an interlocutor. As a result, we don’t make any progress up the escalator of reasoning in figuring out how we want to live.
