THREAD Amid all the uncertainty and anxiety, here are things we’ve seen change for the better in Lebanon. The list, as the events themselves, is disorderly, open-ended, and subject to constant questioning. Feel free to jump in but please keep it civil!

-A level of economic awareness and sophistication among the general public that predates the crisis, but now shapes a vivid, open debate

-Loss of faith in an economy based on imports and financial services, which will—after an extremely painful transition—force an overdue shift toward productive sectors

-Multiple, systematic attempts at documenting corruption—in contrast to unproven accusations used mostly to vent

-Politicians (however inept and irresponsible) oddly trimming down their egos, toning down their speeches, and silencing their convoys’ honks

-Wider accountability, extending to reformists and activists, who have apologized and retreated after getting ahead of the broader movement

-Taboo topics opening up to discussion, such as the history of the civil war, the nature of resistance, relations with Palestinians, etc.

-Essential questioning of established norms and beliefs—in a strong currency, resilient banks, dependable external support, and an inescapable political system

-Civic engagement extending beyond the usual circles of activists, to encompass many Lebanese who seemed to have entirely given up

-Women who have taken, within the protest movement, a more visible version of the active, central, and multifaceted role they already assume within society

-Rich Lebanese at least posing as if they were part of the solution rather than the problem—and in some cases truly providing material support

-Underclass Lebanese getting more involved (whether in civil or riotous fashion) in the process of social, economic, and political change than ever before

-Lowered boundaries between disparate groups who discover problems and demands in common—and all the positive and negative exposure this entails

-A surge in critical thinking within a previously disabused youth, who ask questions, challenge narratives, and seek independent sources of information

-The unprecedented mobilization of teenagers, in a society that tended to either keep them completely out of politics or lock them into factional cocoons

-Accelerated, improvised forms of civic education occurring within families, schools and universities, and the protest movement itself

-A nascent factchecking reflex—which continues to evolve in spite of (and in response to) an explosion of wild rumors and conspiracy theories

-Alongside closed groups on WhatsApp and Instagram, a sudden eruption of Lebanese on Twitter, in a more open, fast-paced digital public space

-A rich use of Arabic in all forms of public communication, including among Lebanese who previously tended to default to English and French

-Reclaiming public space that was traditionally monopolized by political factions, real estate promoters, religious symbolism, and security forces

-Multiplying examples of civic-minded behavior, on the roads, in relation to garbage, and in the more ordinary interactions with the security services

-Different parts of the country appearing in a new light, often to nuance longstanding clichés about their social makeup and political leanings

-Pushback against the factions’ sectarian tactics even in places and within constituencies that were most susceptible to them

-Earnest (if exaggerated) claims to have defeated sectarianism—which won’t happen anytime soon, but still breaks a taboo on a scale unseen before

-A rediscovery of sorts regarding individual and collective rights—many of which had come to be seen as non-existent or unattainable

-Renewed interest in social organizations like syndicates and unions, which so far were held hostage to the political factions

-Lebanese expatriates engaging more seriously and consistently with the country’s problems, instead of wavering between hating Lebanon and romanticizing it