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๐๐ง ๐๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ก๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐๐
All war is about terrain and resources - these are the raw materials of power.
And when multiple entities decide they MUST control a certain place or asset, conflict is inevitable.
One such place is the South China Sea.
Let's go.
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All war is about terrain and resources - these are the raw materials of power.
And when multiple entities decide they MUST control a certain place or asset, conflict is inevitable.
One such place is the South China Sea.
Let's go.
1/
The South China Sea is the geographic location that is keeping the brightest and most connected military thinkers awake at night.
Sprawling 3.5 million sq km, the SCS is a shared body of water touching multiple key nations, and is a critical chokepoint for global trade.
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Sprawling 3.5 million sq km, the SCS is a shared body of water touching multiple key nations, and is a critical chokepoint for global trade.
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Approximately 1/3 of the value of all global trade (~$3 trillion/yr) transits the SCS.
It is the main route for all Chinese on-water trade to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
Many shipments to/from the Americas must also transit the SCS.
(Live map of marine traffic)
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It is the main route for all Chinese on-water trade to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
Many shipments to/from the Americas must also transit the SCS.
(Live map of marine traffic)
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Given its implacable geographic limitations, the region is a true zero-sum pie. Any strategic advance for one nation comes at a cost to the others.
China, and all of its neighbors, have every reason to maximize their own stake in the SCS region.
What to do?
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China, and all of its neighbors, have every reason to maximize their own stake in the SCS region.
What to do?
4/
Though China prefers subversion and multi-layered strategems at the global scale (see my threads on #BeltandRoad at the end of this one), they are a bully in their own backyard.
Going back as far as the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, China pushes the limits.
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Going back as far as the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, China pushes the limits.
5/
There is a diplomatic geography as well.
The US has littered the region with "tripwire" agreements that obligate us to rise to the defense of Japan, Philippines, Thailand, SKorea, and Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression.
The Dragon does not wish to provoke the Eagle.
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The US has littered the region with "tripwire" agreements that obligate us to rise to the defense of Japan, Philippines, Thailand, SKorea, and Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression.
The Dragon does not wish to provoke the Eagle.
6/
Given the strategic importance of the region and the interdependence of rival nations upon the SCS, China knew that any overly-hostile act would do more harm than good.
Their best bet was to simply begin staking territorial claims in the international waters.
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Their best bet was to simply begin staking territorial claims in the international waters.
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However, the SCS is free of any significant mid-sea landmasses, outside of the tiny Paracel and Spratly archipelagos (island chains).
These miniscule islands were not durable enough for any form of infrastructure, and so could not be claimed via "squatter's rights".
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These miniscule islands were not durable enough for any form of infrastructure, and so could not be claimed via "squatter's rights".
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China decided to make the mountain come to them, so to speak.
Since 2013, the nation has invested countless dollars and man-hours into dredging and building of artificial islands throughout the Spratly and Paracel chains, with 3200 acres of new "land" in the Spratlys alone.
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Since 2013, the nation has invested countless dollars and man-hours into dredging and building of artificial islands throughout the Spratly and Paracel chains, with 3200 acres of new "land" in the Spratlys alone.
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This is a very different pattern of behavior than China has used in #BeltandRoad projects.
But, there's a common thread:
The buildout of DUAL-USE infrastructure.
Despite the claims of peaceful civilian/maritime uses, the assets are all ideal for military use as well.
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But, there's a common thread:
The buildout of DUAL-USE infrastructure.
Despite the claims of peaceful civilian/maritime uses, the assets are all ideal for military use as well.
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China is a master of the weaponized Hegelian Dialectic:
Problem-->Reaction-->Solution
They create a problem that provokes a specific reaction, leading to their solution.
Synthesis of a fabricated issue in a way that favors China.
Seem familiar?
https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1195050562728943619
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Problem-->Reaction-->Solution
They create a problem that provokes a specific reaction, leading to their solution.
Synthesis of a fabricated issue in a way that favors China.
Seem familiar?
https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1195050562728943619
11/
Having established the "what", we can now explore the "why".
Keeping with my personal refrain of "Logistics is a map of human intent", let's look at the assets themselves to infer intent.
๐๐ฆ๐ฐ๐จ๐ณ๐ข๐ฑ๐ฉ๐บ
๐๐ฏ๐ง๐ณ๐ข๐ด๐ต๐ณ๐ถ๐ค๐ต๐ถ๐ณ๐ฆ
๐๐ข๐ฑ๐ข๐ฃ๐ช๐ญ๐ช๐ต๐ช๐ฆ๐ด
12/
Keeping with my personal refrain of "Logistics is a map of human intent", let's look at the assets themselves to infer intent.
๐๐ฆ๐ฐ๐จ๐ณ๐ข๐ฑ๐ฉ๐บ
๐๐ฏ๐ง๐ณ๐ข๐ด๐ต๐ณ๐ถ๐ค๐ต๐ถ๐ณ๐ฆ
๐๐ข๐ฑ๐ข๐ฃ๐ช๐ญ๐ช๐ต๐ช๐ฆ๐ด
12/
๐๐๐จ๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ก๐ฒ
The easternmost landmasses in the Spratly Islands sit a mere 130 km from the Philippines' Palawan Island.
The Paracels are less than 350 km from Vietnam.
In the scope of blue-water maritime operations, this is a chip-shot.
13/
The easternmost landmasses in the Spratly Islands sit a mere 130 km from the Philippines' Palawan Island.
The Paracels are less than 350 km from Vietnam.
In the scope of blue-water maritime operations, this is a chip-shot.
13/
However, by occupying these two chains in tandem, China is mounting a claim that their "littoral" (coastal) waters now extend an incredible 1260 km from the Chinese coast.
They've effectively annexed the entire South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory.
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They've effectively annexed the entire South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory.
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This has massive implications across the commercial, geopolitical, and military domains.
The obvious one is that by making this critical sea-route a part of China, they could begin charging tolls to the massive number of ships that transit the waters daily.
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The obvious one is that by making this critical sea-route a part of China, they could begin charging tolls to the massive number of ships that transit the waters daily.
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Recall, war is about control of terrain and resources.
Specifically, you need the former to utilize the latter.
Given the herculean effort China has put into literally building terrain, the resources in question must be worthwhile indeed...
Oh.
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Specifically, you need the former to utilize the latter.
Given the herculean effort China has put into literally building terrain, the resources in question must be worthwhile indeed...
Oh.
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๐๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐
This is the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly chain.
Fully completed in 2017, satellite imagery shows something startling - a full-scale airport in the middle of the SCS.
This is no small feat of finance or engineering.
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This is the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly chain.
Fully completed in 2017, satellite imagery shows something startling - a full-scale airport in the middle of the SCS.
This is no small feat of finance or engineering.
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The FCR runway is large enough to accommodate a Boeing 737 airframe, or midsize fighter jets such as the 5th-gen J-31 Gyrfalcon.
Armed with 6 hardpoints, weapons bay, and a combat range of 780 miles, a J-31 staged at the FCR could reach Manila or Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).
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Armed with 6 hardpoints, weapons bay, and a combat range of 780 miles, a J-31 staged at the FCR could reach Manila or Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).
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In addition, China's dredging operations resulted in deep-water harbors at the Subi and Mischief Reefs.
Island supply chains depend on maritime support. Flying in fuel, consumables, assets, and building materials is cost-prohibitive long term.
Logistics doesn't lie.
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Island supply chains depend on maritime support. Flying in fuel, consumables, assets, and building materials is cost-prohibitive long term.
Logistics doesn't lie.
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The location of Subi Reef's naval base is no mere coincidence.
I've bracketed the primary maritime route through the SCS in orange.
Maritime law enforcement, interdiction, and military operations are all easily supported, while also funneling vessel traffic.
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I've bracketed the primary maritime route through the SCS in orange.
Maritime law enforcement, interdiction, and military operations are all easily supported, while also funneling vessel traffic.
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As one can see, the infrastructure and geography enable significant combined military operations across air, land, surface, and subsurface domains in the SCS.
However, just as important to China is the ability of these islands to extend a defensive perimeter even further.
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However, just as important to China is the ability of these islands to extend a defensive perimeter even further.
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๐๐๐ฉ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐๐ฌ
Any nation concerned with mainland defense against the United States will be aware of the tremendous firepower our Navy brings to bear.
We can deliver crushing force from far-out on water.
Distance is a defender's best ally against the US Navy.
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Any nation concerned with mainland defense against the United States will be aware of the tremendous firepower our Navy brings to bear.
We can deliver crushing force from far-out on water.
Distance is a defender's best ally against the US Navy.
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A single USN carrier strike group boasts:
- Nimitz-class aircraft carrier (up to 90 aircraft)
- Guided missile cruiser (w/ Tomahawk cruise missiles)
- 2 guided missile destroyers
- Resupply vessel
- Attack submarine
The cruiser and sub are the key assets here.
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- Nimitz-class aircraft carrier (up to 90 aircraft)
- Guided missile cruiser (w/ Tomahawk cruise missiles)
- 2 guided missile destroyers
- Resupply vessel
- Attack submarine
The cruiser and sub are the key assets here.
23/
A Ticonderoga-class cruiser or Los Angeles-class submarine armed with Block III Tomahawks has an effective strike range of more than 1600 km.
At that range, the Chinese mainland is reachable from nearly anywhere in the SCS.
The defensive bubble must be pushed out further.
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At that range, the Chinese mainland is reachable from nearly anywhere in the SCS.
The defensive bubble must be pushed out further.
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Recognizing this, in 2017 China began installing advanced A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) surface-to-air missile batteries on several of their SCS island claims.
This map shows the effective range of the batteries for the known SAM assets on the islands.
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This map shows the effective range of the batteries for the known SAM assets on the islands.
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Even more menacing, however, is deployment of the DF-26 to the SCS theater in July of this year.
An intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-26 is highly versatile and capable of destroying ships or ground targets at more than 5,000 km.
Guam is no longer safe.
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An intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-26 is highly versatile and capable of destroying ships or ground targets at more than 5,000 km.
Guam is no longer safe.
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For those unfamiliar, Guam is home to a critical US installation called Naval Base Guam.
It is a major base for the entire Pacific theater, supporting naval operations for the USN Seventh Fleet.
It is attractive for its own distance from traditional missile strikes.
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It is a major base for the entire Pacific theater, supporting naval operations for the USN Seventh Fleet.
It is attractive for its own distance from traditional missile strikes.
27/
But...
While a conventional warhead on the DF-26 would do massive damage to a ship or ground installation, the missile is also reputed to be nuclear-capable.
This has earned the DF-26 the nickname "Guam Killer".
And if Guam isn't safe, the entire SE Asia theater isn't.
28/
While a conventional warhead on the DF-26 would do massive damage to a ship or ground installation, the missile is also reputed to be nuclear-capable.
This has earned the DF-26 the nickname "Guam Killer".
And if Guam isn't safe, the entire SE Asia theater isn't.
28/
The savvy reader will have noticed by now a slow escalation of threat to Chinese non-allies.
It is not that China simply wants to control some islands.
This is about an strategic realignment of power in the entire region.
The Seventh Fleet was once alpha dog.
No more.
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It is not that China simply wants to control some islands.
This is about an strategic realignment of power in the entire region.
The Seventh Fleet was once alpha dog.
No more.
29/
Teddy Roosevelt once said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
For decades, the US Navy's blue-water prowess has buttressed US diplomatic and economic efforts with the subtle threat of overwhelming force.
But there's a logistical limit to this paradigm:
Distance.
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For decades, the US Navy's blue-water prowess has buttressed US diplomatic and economic efforts with the subtle threat of overwhelming force.
But there's a logistical limit to this paradigm:
Distance.
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If an adversary can push the US Navy beyond its practical logistical limits by building a big-enough integrated air defense system (IADS), then the US' biggest stick is broken.
The point of an effective IADS is to build overlapping layers and modes of defense.
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The point of an effective IADS is to build overlapping layers and modes of defense.
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๐๐ก๐๐ญ'๐ฌ ๐๐๐ฑ๐ญ
Tying this together with my previous threads on China's #BeltandRoad, a bigger picture is emerging.
China does not simply wish to connect the world of commerce, and secure its supply chains.
It wants to proliferate the threat of force.
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Tying this together with my previous threads on China's #BeltandRoad, a bigger picture is emerging.
China does not simply wish to connect the world of commerce, and secure its supply chains.
It wants to proliferate the threat of force.
32/
China has moved into a new phase.
We couldn't have seen this coming at the onset of BRI.
We might have seen it when they began building artificial islands.
We should have seen it when they built their naval base at Djibouti.
But we do see it so clearly now.
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We couldn't have seen this coming at the onset of BRI.
We might have seen it when they began building artificial islands.
We should have seen it when they built their naval base at Djibouti.
But we do see it so clearly now.
33/
A ballistic missile shield for the mainland.
A transcontinental railway and highway system.
A "string of pearls" of maritime infrastructure stretching from China to northern Europe.
Allies who would rather play second fiddle to China than stand alone against the US.
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A transcontinental railway and highway system.
A "string of pearls" of maritime infrastructure stretching from China to northern Europe.
Allies who would rather play second fiddle to China than stand alone against the US.
34/
And behind it all, a new narrative:
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฅ๐จ๐ง๐ ๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ง๐.
For the US to survive the coming reality, we must adapt and deploy new solutions in unexpected ways.
The only alternative is...war in the South China Sea.
35/
๐๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ฅ๐จ๐ง๐ ๐ฌ ๐ญ๐จ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ง๐.
For the US to survive the coming reality, we must adapt and deploy new solutions in unexpected ways.
The only alternative is...war in the South China Sea.
35/
For previous threads on China's global push for hegemony under #BeltandRoad , check out this thread attached, and the nested threads therein. https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1192489639547936768
And as promised waaaaay back up in tweet 3, here's the live map as of this morning of the marine traffic in the SCS.
China, Mauritius, and Weaponized Diplomacy https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1195959412545994752?s=19
China and Subsurface Warfare https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1197543841139691520
China and the New Naval Paradigm https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1196560926696235018
China, Ukraine, Engines, and Satellites https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1198406028146163713
China, Ballistic Missiles, and the Trade War https://twitter.com/man_integrated/status/1197153357347074048
