SCOTUS has construed the definition of public official in Section 201 broadly, to reach any person who “occupies a position of public trust w official federal responsibilities,” whatever the “form of delegation of authority.” Dixson v. US, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).

#Giuliani

The statute criminalizes “offering” or “promising” a bribe as well as “demanding” or “seeking” a bribe, so the
government can often charge a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201 **even when the bribe is never actually paid**.

When the thing of value provided is a campaign contribution, the govt must prove the payment was made “in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”

McCormick v. US, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).

In this situation, the thing of value was the investigation of political opponents in exchange for the promise of aid to Ukraine approved by Trump in his official capacity.

Only a promise of quid pro quo is required under the federal bribery statute.

This statute is really designed to deal with bribery of public officials, and not bribery conducted by public officials.

Trump’s crimes are better examined under anti-extortion and self-dealing laws.

Also, there is an argument to be made Trump’s conduct violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act — or that, minimally, Rudy Giuliani and his associates violated the FCPA.