Not really, they& #39;re not. In fact, this is an example of the continuities between Trump and Obama, and how a certain kind of bipartisan foreign policy "realism" has been ascendant in America, despite the internationalist instincts of foreign policy pros. Let me explain. 1/5 https://twitter.com/SohrabAhmari/status/1194656004446793728">https://twitter.com/SohrabAhm...

Trump, like Obama, was very suspicious of arming Ukraine, and for very similar reasons: Neither wanted to escalate with Moscow. (Feel free to speculate about Trump& #39;s motives, but the ultimate consistency in policy should not be dismissed, or forgotten.) 2/5

The story of how Trump came to arm Ukraine is the story of Trump& #39;s foreign policy writ large: He has not been in control of his government since day 1. And the people who served under him—even if they didn& #39;t buy into kompromat theories—thought his instincts bad and dangerous. 3/5

On Ukraine, Trump& #39;s preferences weren& #39;t my preferences. But that& #39;s besides the point. Read @aaronstein1 in @WarOnTheRocks on how staff were unwilling to do what the boss wanted in the Middle East. A similar dynamic was clearly at play on Ukraine. 4/5 https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/u-s-officials-ignored-trump-on-syria-and-we-are-all-paying-the-price/">https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/u...

In Ukraine, like in Syria, Trump got rolled. The decision to sell javelins to Ukraine was counted as a success of the "adults in the room" at the time. And though there hasn& #39;t been a whiplash reversal like in Syria (yet!), no one should think arming Ukraine was Trump& #39;s wish. 5/5