We don't disagree. It's why I avoid loosely using the term "agent"—unless I'm speaking (legally) of a "special agent" agency relationship, such as Papadopoulos agreeing to act on the Kremlin's behalf in setting a secret Trump meeting—and find "asset" even more confusing to people https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1194427754260774913

1/ But @mtaibbi, you *did* just switch the terms of the discussion from one end of the counterintelligence lexicon (agency and asset) to another (collusion). In a counterintelligence Venn diagram, "collusion" overlaps with "agency" and "asset" but is *not* a co-extensive term.

2/ So, for instance, let's take exactly what happened: say Manafort kept Trump apprised of the relationship he was trying to build with Russia (and its cutouts) so that Russia would continue to know Trump was on its side and keep aiding him. Agency? No. Asset? No. Collusion? Yes.

3/ A non-colluding politician who knew America was under cyberattack by Russia—as Trump did—would have at *most* told his domestic political agents to contact the FBI if Russian nationals contacted them re: the election, and at *least* forbid any such contacts. Trump did neither.

4/ Trump profited from—and intended to profit from—his domestic political agents building a clandestine relationship with Russian officials and government agents in order to a) convince Russia Trump was on their side and b) implicitly induce continued pro-Trump Russia assistance.

5/ But what *I've* focused on is the *bribery* and *extra-campaign collusion* elements—as the evidence there is far clearer re: Trump's direct involvement (as compared to *campaign-related* collusion). Russia bribed him—with a real estate deal—to support ending sanctions. Period.

6/ That said, the evidence we got *today* via Gates's testimony was significant precisely *because* it reopened—wide—the *campaign-related* collusion angle, as Gates testified that Manafort was personally updating Trump via nonpublic intel about WikiLeaks' pro-Kremlin activities.