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The myths surrounding the IJN's use of radar at Leyte Gulf really bug me.

The Truth is the IJN surface fleet was well equipped with multiple radars.

I've added text to show the radar fit of the Nagato just before she sailed for the Philippines.

Attached are Jan & Mar 1945 USN intelligence photo interpretations of the three IJN radar types found on the Nagato.

Attached here are clips from a post war USN report detailing the standard late 1944 IJN radar fit out by ship class.

What the IJN lacked at the various battles in and around the Leyte Gulf were combat information centers (CIC), (See clips) training and the maintenance organizations to make radar effective at fleet level.

It was these"soft factors" that crippled the IJN in Oct 1944.

While effective IJN Fleet-wide radar deployment "failed" in Oct 1944. This does not mean there were individual ships that effectively adapted radar technology via hard training.

Adm Ugaki's diaries, and Yamato's Leyte accuracy, make clear he drilled well in "Radar spotting."

In fact, Adm Ugaki's Yamato and the Musashi both learned the trade of "radar spotting" from the captain and radar crew of the cruiser Atago.

The Atago was the USS Washington & her captain the Adm "Ching" Lee of the IJN fleet.

Yasuzo Nakagawa's "Japanese Radar and Related Weapons of WW2" lays out that in Nov 1943 the Captain of Atago was using his Type 22 to monitor a gap in Rabaul's radar network. The network was blind at low level to the north.

This is why Adm Halsey's air strike with Saratoga and Princeton didn't fully surprise IJN the seven IJN cruisers at anchor at Rabaul.

They had enough warning from Atago to be fully manned and have ship's steam during the attack.

The US Navy Leyte Gulf victory owes a great deal to the submarine campaign against Japan, and not just the killing of Atago, but because it delayed the development of the IJN's Type 32 10cm gunfire control radar.

Nakagawa credits USN subs for the Type 32 missing the war.

Had a 1/2 dozen hand built Type 32's been available to the IJN battle line.

Rain squalls would not have protected the embattled Taffy CVE's from the guns of the IJN.

Post script: The Japanese had a huge land based radar network in the Philippines.

Check this comparison to the UK's Chain Home System for scale.