For those who are familiar with me on a more than superficial level, there's an awareness that I work in international shipping.

Specific to this thread, I'm heavily involved in ocean shipping.

This article requires some nuance.

1/ https://twitter.com/JudicialWatch/status/1182022924015935488
First, it's important to distinguish between a "port" and a "terminal operator".

A port is the term for a zone of maritime and surface transport infrastructure. It will have multiple terminals, cranes, container storage pads, railways, and roads on-site.

2/
The Port of Long Beach has six terminals ultimately overseen by the City of Long Beach, which establishes rules and policies through five Harbor Commissioners.

In LB, one of these terminals is called LBCT, a highly-automated facility servicing the Middle Harbor piers.

3/
LBCT is the third-largest of the terminals, handling cargo for the OCEAN Alliance, a vessel-sharing consortium comprising the merged carriers COSCO/OOCL (China), CMA-CGM/APL (France), Evergreen (Taiwan), and PIL (Singapore).

4/
The terminal operator's role is to stow/destow the vessels, handle all of the financial transactions, coordinate ingate/outgate for draymen (container truckers), manage inventory of the containers, and oversee the unionized longshoremen.

5/
Importantly, they DO NOT have legal access to the interior of the containers themselves.

Loaded containers coming in are sealed at origin, with a legal chain of custody to ensure seal integrity from shipper to consignee. If a container is tampered with, it MUST be noted.

6/
Also important to note is that an independent police force (Harbor Patrol) mans the terminals at all time, both in-harbor and on land.

They supplement the many City of Long Beach's Port Police Division and USCBP officers (Customs, Coast Guard) also operating on-site.

7/
So, American law enforcement, American employees, American longshoremen, and American oversight create a multi-layer blanket of touch points that are fanatically observed by Homeland Security and numerous other agencies.

They are dedicated people who take the job seriously.

8/
Thus, any sort of active aid to hostile foreign interests would have to be carefully concealed, and necessarily involve numerous compromised Americans and foreign individuals acting in consort through a series of additional middlemen.

9/
Is it easy to lose one 20' or 40' needle in a massive haystack?

Of course. Happens to me a couple times a year where the answer to my hopping-mad inquiries is "We lost it in the stacks."

BUT, it happens less frequently thanks to advances in digital chain of custody tech.

10/
Point being, any sort of nefarious activities will happen not due to the terminal operator, but due to the incompetence or coordinated corruption of numerous individuals.

Non-state actors are far more likely to be involved in maritime criminality (cartels, terrorists, etc).

11/
So if the threat of Chinese Communist influence isn't likely to manifest in direct support of criminality or terrorist events in the US, that leaves the fear of economic/political pressure.

To be fair, the Chinese have wielded this blade effectively under Belt/Road.

12/
The thing is, the Chinese already have a heckler's veto on US activities through the trade war, access to Chinese markets for US entertainment and technology (Facebook, Hollywood, NBA, etc), and pressure on third-party nations such as Djibouti, Egypt, and in Europe.

13/
We are also not subject to the Belt/Road debt diplomacy paradigm.

If the COSCO/OOCL group fell out of compliance in any way, they lose the lease.

The current buyer, Macquarrie Infrastructure Bank, will likely sell their interests in the next 20 years or so.

14/
And while it was the US Committee for Foreign Investment that pushed the sale under auspices of a security concern, the real goal was likely using the terminal ownership to bigfoot the Chinese goverment as part of the trade war.

Another weapon in our economic arsenal.

15/
Finally, it was ultimately OOIL (the Chinese entity who owned the terminal rights) who chose the winning bid.

There were two suitors: Macquarrie (who holds a cozy relationship with the Chinese) and Yilport (owned by a powerful Turk named Robert Yildirim).

16/
Due to Yildirim also owning CMA CGM, a major rival shipline to COSCO/OOCL, the Chinese selected their Aussie friends Macquarrie.

This was, in the end, mostly a cold-blooded business deal pushed through by the US to punish an intransigent trading partner and peer adversary.

17/
And while I respect Judicial Watch's efforts to investigate and hold public officials accountable, uninformed alarmism is also not in the public interest.

This was also widely reported in the industry, contra JW's assertion that only the local paper noted the US ruling.

18/
I am more concerned with:

-Subversion of our academic and research institutions
-Belt/Road
-Yemen
-Buying oil from Iran to keep the regime liquid
-Strip-mining Africa
-Advances in subsurface warfare, AI, and next-gen aircraft

Keep watching the chokepoints.

19/
ADDENDUM

It is very true that US logistics infrastructure is decaying, undercapitalized, and vulnerable.

We need to have a real, no-BS public pressure campaign to fix it, because in a land as massive as ours, it's our one link to ensure global access for our interior states.
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