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Everyone reads the peroration to the 18 June 1940 “Finest Hour” speech. But what about the first sentence?
“I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium ...
“I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium ...
... at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse.”
This was putting quite a spin on things.
Churchill himself had been one of the loudest voices insisting that the BEF and French northern armies not withdraw immediately.
This was putting quite a spin on things.
Churchill himself had been one of the loudest voices insisting that the BEF and French northern armies not withdraw immediately.
Having done a bit of passing the buck, Churchill then pivoted to the opposite. It would be a “foolish and pernicious process” to hold an inquest into the decisions that had led up to the disaster in France.
This was a warning to his own supporters not to demand a purge of the “Guilty Men”* still in the Cabinet, Chamberlain especially. Churchill know how weak his support was among his own backbenchers still.
*An anachronistic term on 18 June, as ‘Cato’s’ pamphlet wasn’t out yet.
*An anachronistic term on 18 June, as ‘Cato’s’ pamphlet wasn’t out yet.
“During the last few days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication in France.” Having been talked out of attempting a ‘Breton redoubt’ by Brooke, who admittedly hadn’t brought much energy to the job.
He then speaks of the invasion threat. Interesting bit of preempting criticism/managing fears - though he says no massive invasion possible because of maritime supremacy, “the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men.”
Similarly, “there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne soldiers.”
Moving on to the air contest, he says that “In the fighting over Dunkirk ... we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force ... inflicting a loss of three or four to one day after day.” The loss rate cited here reflects the overestimation common on both sides. Losses were about equal.
“During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to the French Army, both by fighters and bombers.” One wonders what the French response to that would have been.
“Our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been.” Oddly this was true, though Fighter Command itself did not believe it, having massively overestimated Luftwaffe reserve numbers.
Discusses bombing next. Points out that the RAF will be launching raids on Germany at least as serious as those inflicted on Britain (sic). Also, that “I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona ...
... and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world.” Interesting comparative attitude towards civilian courage. Later Blitz memories would ascribe survival to British *exceptionalism*, unique character traits.
Discussing the new circumstances of German victory in the west, he says “the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that.” The ‘worst leak’ really the USSR, but this not the moment to bring that up!
“We are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States.” A dubious claim, as we now know. All imports were still subject to cash-and-carry restrictions; many voices in Washington were counseling no more aid.
“Winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard.” The Chiefs of Staff were still arguing that the Nazis were on the verge of economic collapse ...
... while the belief that the conquered peoples of Europe would rise up in massive revolt against German forces died hard.
“We must not forget that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country.” It wasn’t really, but a belief in the imminence of a knock-out blow from the air ...
... had underlain/handicapped British strategy before the war and throughout the Phoney War.
“During [the First World War] we repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us.” A hint at the belief ...
... that the war would be won by internal political/economic collapse in Germany as in 1918, rather than by military victory, which was after all hard to convincingly argue in June 1940.
“The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them.” The French argued (not unreasonably) that with ...
... British military withdrawal from the continent, any obligations they might have been bound to by the March 1940 agreement were now moot.
“The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle.” A nod to the short-lived ...
... proposal for Anglo-French Union, which Churchill rather oversells as being “the desire of many Frenchmen” (it was dismissed without a discussion by Reynaud’s Cabinet) - or much thought out first in Britain.
And then we reach the magnificent peroration, of which much has been said elsewhere. END.
