Reading about thinkers like Olympe de Gouges makes me wonder whether someone committed to the moral intuitions prevalent today really needs to invoke a mysterious notion of 'moral progress' - ie that our moral intuitions have somehow improved over time - to justify themselves. /1 https://twitter.com/nescio13/status/1105147694660636678

Both common-sense and recent research (such as the work of @Moshe_Hoffman) supports the notion that our beliefs are shaped by our incentives. Eg if would get £1million for believing X, or believing X would justify my power and thus enable me to sleep more easily at night, /2

I am not just more likely to *pretend* to believe X, I'm more likely to convince myself that X is true, or to fail to bring my socially- instilled belief in X to sufficient scrutiny.

On this basis, it could be the case that human beings from all time-periods and cultures /3

have been capable of holding the 'correct' moral intuitions, but people's incentives have always had a distortionary effect on their intuitions in a self-serving direction.

Now, when you combine this with the fact that most human societies (including our own) have been deeply /4

hierarchical, you get an interesting conclusion.

Those in power - whether this be on the basis of economic-class, gender, race, spiritual authority, geography, etc - have obvious incentives to distort their moral intuitions in a way that preserves or furthers their power. /5

And we've just stipulated that people's incentives tend to shape their beliefs, so it follows that those in power will tend to have their moral intuitions distorted in favour of their power.

This has two important consequences. First, those in power have greatly outsize /6

influence on the beliefs in others in their society. So you'd expect the moral intuitions of those not in power to be distorted in favour of those in power.

Second, societies are governed according to the beliefs of those in power, and records from those societies skew /6

heavily towards recording the viewpoints of those in power (for a number of reasons, one being that texts and art are usually produced by or for elites). Thus, when we look back on past (or even current foreign) societies, the picture we're going to get is going to represent /7

the moral intuitions of those in power moreso than others in those societies.

On the basis of all the above, the picture I am suggesting is something as follows: Human beings have a 'natural' (whether biological, social, or both) tendency to arrive at the 'correct' moral /8

intuitions. Incentives, however, distort intuitions, and thus the intuitions of those in power are going to be distorted in a direction which serves their power. Those in power have outsize influence on the beliefs of the rest of their society, and thus the intuitions of /9

society as a whole are distorted in a way which serves the existing power-relations. Moreover, our view of the moral beliefs of past societies is skewed to overly take into account the beliefs of those in power, so the beliefs we think they held is further shifted in the /10

direction of power.

And then, crucially: the abolition, lessening, or shifting of social hierarchies is what leads to 'moral progress': there are fewer distorting influences on moral intuitions (eg there are no longer slaveowners, and thus incentives to justify slavery), /11

and fewer means by which distorted moral intuitions can propagate themselves (eg even if white people still have incentives to convince themselves of or fail to challenge intuitions which support their privilege, they have less power over society than they used to by which to /12

spread this, or by which to dominate textual and artistic production such that future historians will mischaracterise our society as being more pro-white-privilege than it actually was).

Thus, if we wanted to justify committment to today's moral intuitions rather than those /13

of some past society, we needn't claim our 'natural' capacity for forming moral intuitions has somehow improved from our ancestors.

We just need to argue that social hierarchies have changed such that there are less distorting influences on our moral intuitions than before, /14

at least in one specific respect (eg we could argue we have better intuitions on racial matters today than before because we live in a less racially hierarchical society).

I don't know if this model of moral-intuition formation is accurate, but past examples of advocates for /15

egalitarianism (such as de Gouges), the rather obvious (and now well-supported by research) idea that incentives shape beliefs, and the fact recent historical scholarship (and common-sense) suggests that oppressive beliefs from the past weren't actually 'normal for their day'/16

but challenged by some amongst the oppressed yet suppressed by the majority of the powerful (eg colonial subjects and their few advocates amongst the colonisers), all lend weight to this model.

This model also has the interesting upshot that, if what drives moral progress is /17

change in social hierarchies, whatever is driving the change in these hierarchies (technology? economics?) is a significant factor in moral progress.

None of this is to deny that there may be some means by which our capacity to form moral intuitions 'naturally' improves over /18

time. I can think of at least three plausible mechanisms:

1. We gather more testimony, and take the testimony more seriously, of more people, and people in respect of more characteristics of themselves. Testimony affects our moral beliefs and intuitions. /19

(This is likely a function of greater egalitarianism though, rather than a separate mechanism.)

2. Very similar to the last point, we have an expanding circle of moral concern. We consider the effects of our actions on a wider group of people (/sentient beings), we consider /20

the effects of our actions on others in respect of a wider range of their characteristics, we subject more of our thoughts and actions to moral scrutiny, and to an ever growing list of things we scrutinise them in respect of, and so on.

3. It is easier to accumulate knowledge/21

and ideas than it is to lose them. Thus, over time, we should expect a gradual increase in moral insight, and the occasional breakthrough.

Anyway, these are just some thoughts of mine. Comments and criticism are more than welcome, and thanks to those of you who made it this far!

Addendum: I'd add a 4th mechanism by which moral progress is possible.

If we're used to something - eg slavery - we're unlikely to think critically about it, and may take it so much as a given that we don't even realise it's a contingent aspect of society we can /1

disentangle from the rest and think critically about. Moreover, even if we do think critically about it, we're likely to be desensitised to it, and take it as so normal or "natural" that we struggle to form the correct intuitions against it.

It's only when we experience a /2

world without slavery that we realise there is something there worth thinking critically about, and are neither desensitised to it nor take it as normal, such that we can evaluate it more objectively.

In this manner, society undergoing changes to allow people to realise /3

the scope of social possibilities, and to give them some detachment such that they can evaluate it objectively, could be a means of improving our moral knowledge and intuitions. 4/4

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." - Lord Acton

Addendum 2: https://twitter.com/Evollaqi/status/1126841687417008128?s=19

Addendum 3: The Stoics held radically left-wing ideals even by today's standards, believed these ideals could be known by reason, and that the features of society which did not confirm to their ideals were not recognised by the gods.

Have our intuitions really changed with time?

Addendum 4: two tweets on this topic (this and the reply) - https://twitter.com/Evollaqi/status/1122066794095755264?s=19