Why do neuro- & psychological scientists cling to archaic forms of philosophy of science, like thinking theories& #39; are useful only if they predict or that we routinely falsify theories in our (sub)fields?

Is it a lack of exposure to philosophy & history of science?

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For predicting (also see @IrisVanRooij et al), there& #39;s nothing special there. You get predictions "for free" with linguistic statements which we would not be comfortable claiming meet the criteria for being theories. Thus "predictive power" isn& #39;t something unique to theories.

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For falsification (see Lakatos), it& #39;s not how we abandon theories in cognitive sciences (incl. neuro & psych). That& #39;s not to say it& #39;s not a useful/appealing property — in fact computational models can ensure that for us (see work w/ @andrea_e_martin, https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/rybh9).

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*That, above, being falsifiability, of course.

I might add more to this thread, but for now I& #39;m not feeling super well so I& #39;ll concentrate on chilling. https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/... draggable="false" alt="✌🏼" title="Siegeshand (mittelheller Hautton)" aria-label="Emoji: Siegeshand (mittelheller Hautton)">

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